



IPv4: Mining Strategic Reserves

BGP Routing Table Complexity and the Transfer Market
APNIC, Jakarta


Jim Cowie, Doug Madory

10 September 2015

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IPv4 transfer is heating up



<https://labs.apnic.net/?p=689>

- The basic story has been well-told
 - ~1000 intra-registry transfers
 - ~175 inter-registry transfers
 - Exhaustion is upon us
 - Markets have begin to function

Transfers create special opportunities for chaos in the BGP Routing System....




Framing the problem

- Initial address allocation is nearly complete, but **allocated != routed** and **routed != used**.
- We have much more demand than supply. Some is visible (public routing table), but not all.
- Let's predict the forward pricing....



IPv4 Routed Addresses, country-level, millions of covered /32s

Source: Dyn IP Transit Intelligence




Perhaps we need a good analogy.

- **Petroleum** is a finite resource with huge demand, no easy substitutes, and efficient global markets.
- We all know oil will run out some day.
- **Why, in practice, does the price of oil not increase monotonically over time?**



Scarcity breeds creativity.

- When prices rise, technology brings previously invisible reserves of oil (and other forms of energy) into the market.
- That causes oil prices to fall, disrupting economies that depend on steady revenue from oil extraction.
- Eventually, however, it will all be gone.



Drilling the Strategic Reserves....

- We have different proven reserves of IPv4 “in the ground”
- Some of them are cheaper to deliver to market than others
- Inter-regional transfer policy will play a huge role in determining global prices, by making North America’s strategic reserves more easily available around the world



Anecdotes from the RIPE experience

As markets heat up, problems are inevitable



Dacia 1300 in Morocco. Credit: Andrew Szabo

Selling a block of addresses is not like selling a car.

Transfer of “title” and handing over the keys typically stops the seller from continuing to drive the car, get traffic tickets, etc.!



Romania is *visibly shrinking*

Much IPv4 address space has been transferred (i.e. “sold”) from Romania

- 930 out of 1856 (50%) blocks transferred through early 2015 were from Romania
- 817 (44%) were from Jump Mgt (AS2541, jump.ro)

Routed Romanian IPv4 address space

1 January 2014 - 5 April 2015



Source: BGP Data



Analyzing the movement of IPv4


Much of the Romanian address space has shown up in the Middle East

- **33%** of the ~4500 prefixes originated in Saudi Arabia were Romanian a couple of months ago
- Iran, Syria, UAE are some other ME nations now using former Romanian IPv4 space



Example of the complexity of handover

- 27-Oct-2014: 46.51.0.0/17 was transferred from Netserv Consult SRL (RO) to Mobile Communication Company of Iran
- Mobile Communication Company of Iran (**AS197207**) began announcing the prefix immediately
- Looks good, the keys have been handed over, the Iranian mobile provider is ready to drive!




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- Mobile Communication Company of Iran (**AS197207**) began announcing the prefix immediately
- ~~Looks good, the keys have been handed over, the Iranian mobile provider is ready to drive!~~

Not so fast...

- Level 3 (AS3356) has announced more-specific prefixes within this range since early 2012:
 - 46.51.16.0/21, 46.51.24.0/21, 46.51.32.0/21 ...



Time passes, impairment mysterious

From October transfer through early December, anyone trying to go to the more-specific /21s within the transferred /17 will end up blackholed (presumably in Romania)

Iranian mobile users trying to use data services to reach content in the USA probably encounter real frustration

The embargo against Iranian users doesn't help clarify the situation - who's blocking them?!


!?

Darwinian Competition: The New Normal?

So starting in early December, AS197207 started announcing all the even-more-specifics of AS3356's more-specifics to regain control over the space!

Had nothing to do with sanctions ..

Just a side effect of a market in which buyers close escrow without establishing clean routability (the seller's responsibility in future standard T&Cs?)




The Good News

- We **haven't seen** the same kind of transfer-related BGP struggle in the APNIC region .. and we've looked fairly carefully.
 - What's different here? Something structural?
 - RIPE and APNIC are **different places**.
 - APNIC has had access to ARIN transfer space for years as exhaustion grew closer
 - Transfers more likely to be **unused space**



Percentage of transferred prefixes routed within X days preceding transfer

Source: Dyn IP Transit Intelligence



The Benefits of Cutting Old Growth Forest



Accidental transfer-related BGP route hijacking takes place because of **conflicting sequential use.**

Photo: Snežana Trifunović


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Consider the history of 207.189.184.0/22



- An “old growth” prefix
- Allocated 25 Feb 1999
- Goes completely unrouted for 16 years

207.189.184.0/22 | American Registry
for Internet Numbers/PACIN | AP | ARIN |
19990225



16 March 2015: Transferred ARIN-APNIC


ipv4 | 207.189.184.0/22 | American Registry for Internet
Numbers / **PACIN** | AP | ARIN | 19990225 | Octane Marketing (P)
Ltd. | IN | APNIC | 20150316

Note: This was always “in India” within ARIN space, from the ancient days, so the transfer isn’t going far.

What happened next?




22 May 2015: Softlayer starts routing in India



12 July 2015: Alternate-origin more-specific appears

Origins of 207.189.186.0/24 (Asia Pacific Network Inform

10 Jul 2015 - 15 Jul 2015 (Times in UTC)



Source: BGP Data



AS18229 (a non-Softlayer datacenter) begins to sink traffic to the 3rd /24 in the /22 – **potentially alarming!**


50 days have passed since first origination by Softlayer

Is this a hijacking?



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12 July 2015: Alternate-origin more-specific appears



Routing similarity to the Softlayer covering /22 is close to zero – worrisome - these are clearly distinct applications





trackcampaigns.com

September 6, 2015

In my portfolio ?

Add to my portfolio

Network details ?

Map of IPv4 hosts ▶

IPv4 hosts for top domains ▶

See network connectivity at each location:

Filter by:

Location ▲ Organizations ▼

Ashburn, VA, US	Octane Marketing (P) Ltd. ▶
Saket, India	Octane Marketing Private Limited ▶

Showing 1 to 2 of 2 entries

Map of IPv4 hosts for trackcampaigns.com ?



Feedback



trackcampaigns.com

September 6, 2015

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Showing 1 to 2 of 2 entries

IPv4 Hosts for trackcampaigns.com ?

Filter by:

IP Address	Prefix	Organization	AS	City	Country	Domains
119.81.142.26	119.81.128.0/18	Octane Marketing Private Limited	SoftLayer Technologies AS36351	Saket	India	images.trackcampaigns.com
199.166.35.9	199.166.34.0/23	Octane Marketing (P) Ltd.	SoftLayer Technologies AS36351	Ashburn, VA	United States	www.trackcampaigns.com trackcampaigns.com

The relationship among Octane, Softlayer, and local content hosting in India seems plausible.

Showing 1 to 2 of 2 entries

Why this set off all our alarm bells:



- Recent transfer (inter-regional at that)
- Multiple origin ASNs
- Sequential expression of more-specific routes (“taking control” of part of the routed space)
- Origins have no clear preexisting transit or peering relationship in the history of the BGP routing table
- This is what **leasing** will look like.



Summary: Markets Require Measurement

- Carefully research the **historical routing** of networks for sale and any more specifics. Appropriate settling time?
- Don't forget DNS: Legacy FQDNs that point to transfer space can bring the buyer unwanted (nasty) traffic.
- Configure **aggressive routing alarms** on any purchased prefix via a 3rd party service, **especially** if the network has been previously routed (less common in APNIC)
- Brokers may want to explore 'clean routing' assertions at close of escrow (maybe even clawbacks) as a part of standard T&Cs





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Recent historical trends in IPv4 address consumption
APNIC, Jakarta

Jim Cowie, Doug Madory
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