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Improving Route Object processes in WHOIS

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Route Object Template

route:	[mandatory]	[single]	[primary/look-up key]
descr:	[mandatory]	[multiple]	[]
origin:	[mandatory]	[single]	[primary/inverse key]
holes:	[optional]	[multiple]	[]
country:	[optional]	[single]	[]
member-of:	[optional]	[multiple]	[]
inject:	[optional]	[multiple]	[]
aggr-mtd:	[optional]	[single]	[]
aggr-bndry:	[optional]	[single]	[]
export-comps:	[optional]	[single]	[]
components:	[optional]	[single]	[]
remarks:	[optional]	[multiple]	[]
notify:	[optional]	[multiple]	[inverse key]
mnt-lower:	[optional]	[multiple]	[inverse key]
mnt-routes:	[optional]	[multiple]	[inverse key]
mnt-by:	[mandatory]	[multiple]	[inverse key]
changed:	[mandatory]	[multiple]	[]
source:	[mandatory]	[single]	[]



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holes:	[optional] [multiple]	[]
country:	[optional] [single]	[]
member-of:	[optional] [multiple]	[]
inject:	[optional] [multiple]	[]
aggr-mtd:	[optional] [single]	[]
aggr-bndry:	[optional] [single]	[]
export-comps:	[optional] [single]	[]
components:	[optional] [single]	[]
remarks:	[optional] [multiple]	[]
notify:	[optional] [multiple]	[inverse key]
mnt-lower:	[optional] [multiple]	[inverse key]
mnt-routes:	[optional] [multiple]	[inverse key]
mnt-by:	<pre>[mandatory] [multiple]</pre>	[inverse key]
changed:	[mandatory] [multiple]	[]
source:	[mandatory] [single]	[]

Asserts an origin-AS in origin: over the prefixes in route:



[::::

ROA Object ASN.1 (RFC6482)

```
RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
         version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
         asID ASID,
         ipAddrBlocks SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddressFamily }
      ASID ::= INTEGER
      ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE {
         addressFamily OCTET STRING (SIZE (2..3)),
         addresses SEQUENCE (SIZE (1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress }
      ROAIPAddress ::= SEQUENCE {
         address IPAddress,
```

maxLength INTEGER OPTIONAL }

IPAddress ::= BIT STRING





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ROAIPAddress ::= SEQUENCE {
 address IPAddress,

maxLength INTEGER OPTIONAL }

IPAddress ::= BIT STRING

Asserts an origin-AS in asID over the prefixes in ipAddrBlocks with optional maxLength





Observations

- Route objects
 - Simple use, specify origin-as/prefix relationship
 - Complex use, to add route qualifiers/aggregation
- Simple use invokes behavior similar to a ROA
- ROA creation vests with prefix holder only
 - No AS holder input
 - Strong trust in the system to make ROA
- ROUTE: object creation vests in AS and prefix holder
 - Both must countersign a create or update request, if not the same maintainer.





Observations

- Process delays at APNIC
 - Post- final /8 policy, more people present with prefix only, to be routed by ISP/provider
 - But process to get route object countersigned is clumsy, different provisioning paths in ISP
 - APNIC increasingly asked to intervene, adds delay
- Goal: simplify processes and speed up announcement of new prefixes
 - Change WHOIS permission model to permit simple route: object creation solely on permission of prefix holder.





Ideas?

- Searching for feedback and suggestions
 - Modest suggestions of our own.
 - Or, what you'd like automated
- Bring RPKI and IRR into alignment ٠
 - "say the same things"
 - Getting a lot to manage
 - Avoid adding to workload
- How about an 'Automatic ROA' creation?
 - Match ROA with route objects. Consistent state in both systems
 - If we go down the 'create a ROA' path
 - Automatic route object
 - Sensible idea? Worth exploring? ٠



