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>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: Welcome back to the Open Policy Meeting Session 2. We are starting now, and Ching-Heng will do the Policy SIG Administration. Go ahead.

>> CHING-HENG KU: Welcome all of you for joining the Policy -- (audio fading in and out)

Okay, thank you. I'll go to the Policy SIG Meeting Agenda. So, in this session, I will introduce the SIG Administration. Dave will introduce the Policy Impact Assessment. Then there are four proposals: 162 and 167, proposed by Jonathan; another is 166, Job, and 164, Chris.

And the consensus decision making is the general agreement taking into consideration comments on the mailing list and at the Open Policy Meeting. And there are the minor objections and the major objections. So, if you have a major objection, propose your opinions. And we hope the participants should work together to resolve objections. There is our Code of Conduct under the following URL.

So, gauging consensus, the chairs will consider the mailing list discussion, the discussion at the Open Policy Meeting, and then Confer.

Confer access is so all registered conference attendees can access without creating a separate Confer account. So, if you have already logged into the Open Policy Meeting, you can simply click on the Confer link to access it to participate in the proposal consensus decision. For this reference for my

presentation. Thank you.

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: Thank you, Ching-Heng. Now, Dave for Secretariat Impact Assessment on prop-162.

>> DAVE PHELAN: All right, prop-162. So, again, this has been published, the mailing list as well as the website. So, Section 4 mentions that "APNIC should cause any existing bulk users of APNIC WHOIS data to remove the contact information from their own systems and from the Internet." APNIC has limited ability to monitor with respect to who previously downloaded and/or published WHOIS data, so unless there is a clear breach of the AUA, it is very difficult for us to tie that to any specific party.

In terms of implementation, it would require updates to the WHOIS data user agreement; revocation of access to Bulk WHOIS for existing users. We would also do automatic removal after a set time period, as well as re-signing of the AUA, as well as improved systems for recording acceptance of new terms for each entity; filtering the dataset for bulk WHOIS consumption. If this proposal reaches consensus, implementation time frame would be approximately four months.

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: Thank you, Dave. John? Where is John? There he is. John will be presenting prop-162, WHOIS Privacy. You can go whenever you want.

>> JONATHAN BREWER: Hello. Jonathan Brewer. All good. This is a proposal for WHOIS Privacy for bulk access. At the moment, more than 400 users have bulk access to APNIC's WHOIS. They can download the entire dataset. Separately -- and we're not saying that correlation equals causation -- but separately, it is evident that APNIC WHOIS contact data is being misused.

Now, the objective of the policy change is to eliminate the unnecessary distribution and retention of bulk APNIC member organization contact information by third parties. The contact information, meaning street addresses, phone numbers, fax numbers, personal email addresses. So, this policy change will not prevent APNIC members or other authorized users of APNIC WHOIS from obtaining contact details for network resources in ad hoc or automated queries. We will address that separately.

Now, the situation in other regions. I haven't found any evidence that other RIRs limit access to contact details. However, ICANN has sunsetted the use of WHOIS for Internet domains as of 28 January, and a large part of the reason they sunsetted WHOIS is because of personally identifiable information in WHOIS contact details. So, I have not submitted this proposal in other regions and I don't have a plan to do so at this time.

With the exception of abuse contact information, APNIC should remove the address, phone number, fax number, email, and

notify fields from org, IRT, and role objects in the Bulk Access dataset. And this is the part that's a little bit contentious, because of course, APNIC legal team doesn't have jurisdiction to go after users, but they should cause existing Bulk users of APNIC WHOIS data to remove the contact information from their own systems and from the Internet. Now, the latter part -- the Internet -- I think APNIC does have the ability to do that, at least by asking nicely with a big stick.

Advantages. This should enhance privacy and data sovereignty. It should also reduce nuisance contacts. What are nuisance contacts? Telephone calls in the middle of the night from people trying sell you services. Emails to your abuse contact, trying to sell you more IP addresses.

Anyway, understandings. Out of the 400-some users, all of whom were surveyed on their use of the WHOIS data, two users -- two legitimate users of the data -- said that they would be inconvenienced by the change. A third user said that they would be inconvenienced but also admitted they were using the data against the acceptable use policy. That was Akamai. They still have not responded to my questions as to why they were doing this.

There will be no impact on APNIC resource holders. In summary. Removes all the contact information except abuse information from the bulk WHOIS; requires existing bulk WHOIS users to remove the contact information from their own systems and the Internet. And, yeah, questions?

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: Any questions or comment?

>> JONATHAN BREWER: I see somebody moving. Good, she's not just going to leave the room. Ah, she's just changing chairs. Yes, please.

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: Please state your name and affiliation and go ahead.

>> RIPE NCC, probably not in the policy process yet --

>> JONATHAN BREWER: Can you bring the mic closer?

>> I can hand hold it. This will work. In the policy proposal on the website, I see the requirement to renew periodically. I applied for this access for my team, and we need somebody with signing powers to actually sign this contract. So, if you want to use the same procedure for validating that somebody wants to renew their access, it might be a very high burden on users because it's easy for me to say that we're still actively using the dataset and we're using it for (?) access, but it's difficult for me to get somebody with signing powers to actually sign a document again. That's something I would want to bring to your attention.

>> JONATHAN BREWER: Thank you. I acknowledge your difficulty and pain, but at the same time, I would like to state

that bulk access to WHOIS gives you an incredible amount of information, and that information should not just be granted to a large company, unless the large company's management know that they're getting that data.

Is it possible for the secretariat to put the impact statement from APNIC back on the slides? Because I'm interested in looking at that again. Thank you. Any more? Next question, then, from online, from Melody, I guess.

>> MELODY BENDINDANG: Hello, I'm Melody from APNIC. There is a question on Zoom, which says "I support this proposal-based fee, but is there any mechanism for law enforcement agencies to investigate illegal behaviors if the proposal gets the community consent?"

>> JONATHAN BREWER: Law enforcement agencies can get all of the data that they need on an ad hoc basis by using the interactive WHOIS service. This is only a restriction on the distribution of the entire dataset at once.

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: Please.

>> AUDIENCE: Yeah, Pankesh, ISPI. I'll hold it. Sorry. Just, one is that the proposal, does it mean that whosoever has the entitlement or the access as a bulk user are only being restricted, or are we planning to remove all these, the data points which you just talked about, about the WHOIS contacts, and only the abuse will be left? Is that what we are doing, only for the bulk user, but for the individual who is search, if I am doing for an ASN or IP address, will I still get all the details?

>> JONATHAN BREWER: The bulk dataset will only have the abuse contact in it. But for an individual who is search -- when you're searching for just one ASN or just one IP address, yes, you will get all details.

>> Yeah, because the reason I asked was that, generally, the restriction is for the bulk user, not for the LEs and other users who would like to check the credentials of a particular ASN. If that is the case, then that is okay, that the proposal, I'm okay with the proposal. But altogether, the data cannot be removed from the WHOIS search if it is in digital search, because not a lot of people have given their contacts. They are the commercial or technical contacts of particular IP addresses, and they are well aware that it is in a public domain. Thank you.

>> JONATHAN BREWER: Yes, that is correct. So, this is only affecting the complete bulk WHOIS dataset. And if you make a query for an individual IP address or ASN, you will get all of the details.

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: Matthew?

>> MATTHEW ENGER: Matthew from Leaptel. I support this and

I don't have any qualms with an organization being forced to re-sign a document if they're getting all this data. If they don't want to re-sign it, they don't get the data. Not my problem.

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: Thank you. Anarag now.

>> Thank you. Just want to ask, when you say that bulk should only include the abuse contact, nothing else, does that mean that bulk access would not even have address, or it would still have the address of IP addresses and AS administrations?

>> JONATHAN BREWER: That's correct, bulk access would not even have the address. The accessible use policy of this dataset does not allow its use for geolocation. APNIC has a separate product that is available for geolocation, so there should be no problem with removing address from this bulk dataset.

>> AUDIENCE: Okay. I don't have geolocation in mind, but thanks for clarification.

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: Tina?

>> TINA MORRIS: Tina Morris, AWS. I am a consumer of this data for my team. We use it for research purposes and I don't use any of this contact info, so don't really have a problem with it being removed. However, I do want to comment on two things. The signatory responsibility for the data is a bit of an illusion. In a large organization, I guarantee the person who has signed it has little oversight on how we actually use it. That's really me. But I can't be a signatory, so it's kind of a catch-22.

And then, as far as the data's still there, if you look at the individual data, so this just means that organizations that want it will scrape the individual and it will be a burden on APNIC servers, which is a very unfortunate side effect of what you're trying to accomplish.

>> JONATHAN BREWER: Thank you, Tina. In response to that, I can tell you the next policy proposal we're discussing should eventually lead to an elimination of scraping the public dataset.

>> TINA MORRIS: Gotcha. Thanks.

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: Yes, please go.

>> ALBAN KWAN: My name's Alban Kwan, speaking in personal capacity. Just wanted to offer some insight into the related policy in ICANN world on WHOIS privacy. There was a particular concern in relation to cybersecurity and law enforcement after the redaction of WHOIS, basically because a lot of the domain name WHOIS records are being used to correlate the registrant for law enforcement research purposes. They reach the redaction and access of who is there on domain basis, that's caused some problem in practice.

However, in my own opinion, the IP address WHOIS should not

be used in a similar fashion. So, although in the year, there was a subsequent regulation that actually forced the opening -- reopening of the WHOIS record on the domain name, but I don't believe this particular policy on IP address would cause a similar concern. Thank you.

>> JONATHAN BREWER: Thank you.

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: Aftab.

>> AFTAB SIDDIQUI: Just need a clarification, John. You just mentioned that the bulk access will give you the access to the abuse data.

>> JONATHAN BREWER: The bulk access will give you the abuse email address.

>> AFTAB SIDDIQUI: Yes. Is that the IRT object or the email address in the IRT object or the email address in the abuse role object, which APNIC copies from the IRT object?

>> JONATHAN BREWER: Yes. I'm sorry, but the WHOIS is structured so incredibly poorly, it's very, very difficult to answer this question precisely.

>> DAVE PHELAN: Dave Phelan, APNIC Secretariat. We asked the same question and it was clarified in this version where they have said it will be IRT and abuse NC, so that will still be published.

>> JONATHAN BREWER: By the way, I should add that I am reading everything that everyone at the microphone says because I can't actually hear anything. So, if you see me staring at the screen, it's because I actually cannot hear you from the fans behind me. Sorry about that. Can we have that impact statement again on the screen? The APNIC impact -- secretariat impact? I just wanted to make two comments, one comment, maybe, to that Impact Statement. There we go.

So, automatic removal after a set time period. Revocation of access to Bulk WHOIS for existing users. I think this is fantastic. And one of the reasons I think this is fantastic is that APNIC sent a survey out to all 400-plus consumers of Bulk WHOIS data, and the response rate was abysmal. It was in the low 10s, I think. Very, very, very few people who are authorized to have access to the entirety of APNIC's WHOIS couldn't be troubled to respond to a survey about it. So, I think that too many people have access to this data and that we need a reset. And I think that this will be part of it. Are there any other questions I can help with?

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: So, if there's no other questions or comments, we will go for consensus call. Excuse me.

Before we go for consensus call, remember to login to Confer, for those who wish to use this tool. So, this policy proposal has been discussed on the mailing list, in today's OPM, the APNIC PDP requires the community to reach consensus or a

general agreement on a proposal before it can proceed. So, now I will make the consensus call. Confer should be online. Yes, it is. So, you'll be given the opportunity to express your opinion, whether you strongly support, support, neutral, oppose, or strongly oppose. If you strongly oppose this proposal, you will have to step up and explain why.

So, if you strongly support this proposal, please raise your hand. Thank you. If you support this proposal, please raise your hand. Thank you. If you are neutral to this proposal, please raise your hand. Thank you. If you oppose this proposal, please raise your hand. Excellent. If you strongly oppose this proposal, please raise your hand. Thank you.

I will now confer with my co-chairs and get back to you very shortly. Aftab has a comment?

>> AFTAB SIDDIQUI: One clarifying question. I strongly support this proposal. Just want to clarify again, John. I mean, even though we support it, we would like -- I would like to see more clarity as written in this. You have explained it and then confirmed by David, but I would say the proposal written as is has this ambiguity of IRT and role object. It says both. So, if that can be clarified in the proposal itself, that will be fine. Clarification is easy. I mean, the role object of the abuse -- if that line is there, then at least I can sleep peacefully.

>> JONATHAN BREWER: I would be very happy to make this as clear as possible, yes.

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: Dave, we will deal with this in editorial. It's fine. Thank you for the last comments. So, this proposal reached consensus.

The next step in the PDP is to take the proposal to the APNIC Member Meeting and seek a continued consensus there. The proposal will then be posted back to the mailing list for a four-week comment period. And if required, that period could be extended by -- to eight weeks. Thank you, John, for your proposal, and you can... Don't move. You're next.

But first, Dave is going to do the assessment for the next proposal.

>> DAVE PHELAN: All right. This is for John's next proposal, prop-167 Version 1: Published Statistics on Directory Service Usage. This impact assessment was done for version 1, but version 2 is being presented today.

So, generally, we are currently developing an enhanced privacy compliance program, which will culminate a revised privacy statement. The collection and publication of this usage data, if the proposed policy reaches consensus, will be factored into this program and the resulting updated privacy statement.

Version 2 of this added some additional requirements based

on our community feedback. I have consulted with the engineering teams and we have some concerns about producing this consumption for use by APNIC, has limited ongoing value, would require high work effort from our software teams to implement.

If this policy reaches proposal, the implementation time frame would be approximately three months. This is for version 1. If the added elements for version 2 were added, it would need a separate assessment, but an estimate to implement, if possible, would be greater than 12 months.

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: Thank you, Dave. John, you're up.

>> JONATHAN BREWER: Thank you, Dave. Okay. So, this is a proposal for published statistics on directory service usage. When I say "directory service," I mean WHOIS and RDAP. So, what is the problem? The traffic appears to have grown beyond levels that are consistent with intended operational use. Again, correlation does not equal causation, but it could include data mining, bulk harvesting or automated analysis by parties outside the network operator community with either good or bad intent. Without a visibility into these usage patterns, APNIC members lack the information necessary to develop appropriate policy responses.

I could be standing here and saying, we need to rate limit access to WHOIS; we need to rate limit access to RDAP; we need to be returning less information in these queries. But I can't even describe the scale of the problem right now.

I can show you this. In a single hour, in April of 2025, there were 380,000 unique IP addresses across the Internet making requests for APNIC member data from the WHOIS. Now, there are not 380,000 network operators in this world. There aren't 380,000 network operators, law enforcement agencies, and cybersecurity companies capable of using WHOIS in this world. This is not normal traffic. This is not traffic that WHOIS and RDAP were intended to cope with. And April was not a one-off case. We can see this happening consistently throughout a three-month period. Even 100,000 unique IP addresses in one hour is a lot for WHOIS.

So, the objective of this policy change is greater transparency around system usage, allowing us to have informed policy discussions around acceptable use of our systems, and sustainability of our systems because they consume resources. As members, we pay into APNIC and operational budget goes to keeping these systems accessible. We will also, hopefully, be able to identify possible abuse or anomalous use. And as part of the version 2, which the secretariat is not too happy with, it would enable members to track queries on their own resources.

So, the situation in other regions. There are no other regional Internet registries who are publishing realtime stats

or even near-realtime stats on WHOIS or RDAP. Historical or aggregate statistics are sometimes provided on request. That said, it took APNIC a month to give me data on WHOIS and RDAP use, and the data that I got was not very rich and not very interesting. I haven't submitted this proposal to other RIRs, and I don't have immediate plans to do so.

So, what is the proposed policy solution? Statistics about directory services usage, updated hourly, including the number of queries received by the WHOIS and RDAP services broken down by source ASN, source IP, and service. Now, I say for the top thousand ASNs, what I expect is that we're going to see, I don't know, 20 or 50 ASNs accounting for almost all of the traffic? I don't expect to see any sort of a normal distribution here, but I can't say that for sure because I have no good information.

Source IP address count per ASN. Do we have an ASN where there are 5,000 IP addresses within this ASN making requests? Then we probably have a problem. That would indicate that somebody is spreading their traffic across multiple IP addresses to get around rate limits. If you're getting around rate limits, you're using it in a way that we're not intending you to use it.

And of course, what kind of service they're accessing, whether it is the WHOIS service itself with the text or the RDAP service.

I'd like to see some metadata, such as the query type and method. I'd like to see this data published in machine readable format, such as CSV or JSON, so that we can do our own analysis. And the final point, which is contentious for the secretariat, including a feature within MyAPNIC portal, allowing resource holders to view how many times their allocated resources have been queried, broken down by query type and ASN, if possible. I would like to note that "if possible" applies to the entire point. So, if it is not possible for APNIC to provide, per ASN stats, in MyAPNIC, then it's not possible.

Advantages: Improves transparency and member insight into a core APNIC function. What do we do here? We give out IP addresses and we keep a record of who has IP addresses, and we answer queries about who has IP addresses. Core service. Helps us identify abnormal or potentially abusive usage patterns. We can just guess based on the data that we have now that the WHOIS is being abused. We might see for sure. It informs future policy proposals on potential rate limiting of WHOIS and RDAP, access controls, or developing appropriate acceptable use policies.

Disadvantages: The initial secretarial impact statement said that there was a medium level of impact on software teams for the main set of statistics, and, of course, APNIC will have to develop a method for extracting and publishing the requested data. If APNIC is to execute on version 2 of this, then it seems

like the impact on software teams will be a little bit higher. But rather than just saying 12 months is very hard, APNIC should say, this is what's possible, this is how long it will take, so we can have an informed discussion of how this policy should be shaped.

There should be no impact on APNIC resource holders, at least not if they're using the WHOIS and RDAP in the way it was intended to be used.

Summary: Use of directory services appears to be inconsistent with network operations; the scope of the problem is unknown because we just don't have the information; and publication of use statistics will aid in development of future policies. Questions?

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: Questions or comments for John. Please state your name and affiliation beforehand.

>> MATTHEW ENGER: I'm Matthew Enger from Leaptel. I strongly support version 1 of this proposal. I think it's a really, really good idea. I agree that version 2 probably will have very short shelf life in terms of usefulness, although it would be quite interesting to know who's querying my records and know, but I think that if version 1 was implemented, we would get to a point that we actually have a very good understanding of what things are to be able to make decisions to move forward. So, I'd be very supportive of version 1.

>> AFTAB SIDDIQUI: AftabSiddiqui.com. I agree with Matthew, it's the implementation part which I think the author can discuss with the secretariat, how it should be implemented. But I want to just highlight that what you're going to get, ultimately, that would be AWS, Google Cloud compute, and all the other big cloud operators, ASNs, showing up there, because most of these coming out behind all these ASNs. But probably, so don't put at least a thousand ASNs as a limit. I know it's a big number, but don't put a limit there. If you're getting the data on a JSON through that file that would be interesting anyway, visualize what you want to visualize, but that's all implementation.

Going back to the proposal, I support that strongly. It should have been done anyway, but yeah.

>> JONATHAN BREWER: Thank you. And I'd like to comment, 1,000 isn't a limit. The exact text is "for at least the top 1,000 ASNs."

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: Melody.

>> MELODY BENDINDANG: Hi, I'm Melody from APNIC. There is a question for John on Zoom. This is from Liam Robert Stephens speaking on his own capacity. Thank you for your proposal. I would like to see the address of companies querying, however, I believe this has privacy implications. For example, bad actors

may be able to identify the source IP addresses used in network infrastructure. Can you please comment? Thanks.

>> JONATHAN BREWER: I'm not proposing to give out the addresses of the companies querying; I'm proposing to publish the ASNs and the number of IP addresses within an ASN. So, there won't be anything personally identifiable published in the data that would cause the type of harm that you're suggesting.

>> AUDIENCE: Hi, again. I'm from University of Malaysia and I'm also a policy fellow, speaking on my behalf. I have a very small question. I want to know why hourly basis?

>> JONATHAN BREWER: Please, go ahead. Oh, you want to know on an hourly basis.

>> AUDIENCE: Yes.

>> JONATHAN BREWER: Ah. Because on a per-minute basis would be too difficult --

>> AUDIENCE: Why not daily basis?

>> JONATHAN BREWER: Oh. Because on a daily basis, we don't --

>> AUDIENCE: Actually --

>> JONATHAN BREWER: We don't have an idea if people are load spreading. If we publish these on an hourly basis, we're more likely to see some organizations spreading the load of scraping the entire database across a number of hours. If we just see this on a daily basis, this could be hidden.

>> AUDIENCE: But don't you think it's going to be a lot of data to manage?

>> JONATHAN BREWER: Oh, no, no, no, no. The amount of data here may seem like a lot, but at cloud scale now? I mean, a billion records in a database isn't even big data anymore. I mean, I have Postgres instances with billions of records in them. It's just not a lot.

>> AUDIENCE: Okay, thank you.

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: Any more questions or comments? From Zoom?

>> JONATHAN BREWER: I would just like to reiterate again, version 2 is, if possible. So, if it is not possible for APNIC to publish personally statistics tied to ASNs in MyAPNIC, then it's not possible. Melody, did you have someone from... no? Okay.

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: So, if there's no more comment or question, we will go for the consensus call. No one? Okay. So, remember to login on Confer, if you want to use this tool. And this policy proposal has been discussed on the mailing list and during this session. The PDP required the community to reach a consensus or general agreement for the proposal before it can proceed.

So, for the consensus call, you will be given five options:

Strongly support, support, neutral, oppose, or strongly oppose. And again, if you strongly oppose, you will have to step up and express why. So, if you strongly support this proposal, please raise your hand.

>> JONATHAN BREWER: Sorry, can we get confirmation that we are doing a consensus call for version 1 or version 2?

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: Ooh. Usually, we put consensus call for the last version.

>> JONATHAN BREWER: This with a consensus call for version 2, and I did mention several times that if version 2 is not possible, then it's not possible. This is how the policy is written.

>> AUDIENCE: So, you can only have a consensus call for something as presented, so we are all voting for version 2, which the impact assessment says it is hard, it takes 12 months --

>> At least.

>> Not impossible. So, we are voting for v2.

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: Exactly.

>> Hard, hard, hard.

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: Okay, so, this being cleared up, I will redo the consensus call. So, if you strongly support version 2, please raise your hand. If you support this proposal, please raise your hand. Thank you. If you are neutral to this proposal, please raise your hand. If you oppose this proposal, please raise your hand. And if you strongly oppose this proposal, please raise your hand.

Thank you all. I will now take a few seconds to check, talk with my co-chairs. Okay, so, this proposal reached consensus during the OPM.

(Applause)

So, the next step in the PDP is to take this proposal to the APNIC Member Meeting and seek a continued consensus there. The proposal will then be posted back to the mailing list for a four-week comment period, and if required, this period will be extended up to eight weeks.

Thank you, John. And now for -- oh, Dave is already there. Perfect.

>> DAVE PHELAN: I'm already here. All right, this is the Secretariat Impact Analysis for prop-166 version 1: Revocation of Persistently Non-functional RPKI Certification Authorities. This was published to the mailing list and to the website for the full version.

Due to the low number of self-hosted CAs within the APNIC service region and the unlikely nature of there being a significant number being added, the following impacts have been observed. We would need to do some system updates to monitor

manifests and CRLs. There would be a slight increase to the Member Services team for non-functional CA operators to try and resolve.

If this policy proposal is accepted, APNIC will be required to revoke the certificates of certificate holders who choose the self-hosted CA setup in instances where their manifest or their CRLs have not been updated for a period longer than 60 days. APNIC will need to update the APNIC Certification Practices Statement, otherwise known as the CPS, to encompass the Proposed Policy requirements. APNIC will need to update the RPKI Terms and Conditions to encompass the proposed policy requirements. If this proposal was to reach consensus, implementation time frame would be approximately three months.

>> MELODY BENDINDANG: Thank you, Dave. We have Job Snijders with us online. He is going to present his proposal online. Job, can you hear me?

>> JOB SNIJDERS: I can hear you. Good morning, Vietnam. Can you hear me?

>> MELODY BENDINDANG: We can hear you.

>> JOB SNIJDERS: Can you hear me properly?

>> MELODY BENDINDANG: Yes, I can hear you.

>> JOB SNIJDERS: Ah, perfect. Thank you for having me! All right. Title slide. Let's see... I would like to present on a proposal to revoke things that have been broken for a long period of time. That's currently not happening, and in this presentation, I'll sort of outline what I perceive as the issue and what the policy solution can be. Next slide, please.

So, the problem is that it is fairly easy to configure a self-hosted certification authority -- other regions call this a delegated CA, but those terms are interchangeable. And you configure this once, and then into perpetuity, the configuration is broken, and it clobbers up the sys log of validators. So, in the case of APNIC, there are currently ten CAs that have been broken for longer than 60 days. There are roughly 5,000 validator instances on the Internet, and assuming they validate every ten minutes, that means that every hour, 300,000 lock lines are recorded about those ten CAs being broken. So, even though only a small number of CAs has a persistent issue, it scales poorly in terms of the global Internet context.

And not only is syslog impacted, these validators also make connection attempts to end points that are maybe offline, and this is a waste of time, and yeah, that's what this policy proposal's about. Next slide, please.

So, the objective is to give APNIC a mandate to revoke the certificate authority to those that have been broken for a long period of time. A long period is defined as 60 days. And if we have a policy in place, then APNIC will be able to revoke these

certificates, whereas at this point in time, it is unclear what APNIC should do with these persistently broken configurations. Next slide, please.

There is a similar proposal in the RIPE NCC region. Both APNIC and RIPE NCC have a number of delegated CAs or relegated CAs, so this is applicable in both regions. In the RIPE NCC region, the policy proposal is, I guess, one step further in the policy development process compared to where the policy proposal is in the APNIC region. As of yesterday, the RIPE (?) of this proposal is now in last call, which means there now is an opportunity, a final opportunity to express disagreement with the proposal, but so far, in the last five months, as this proposal has been going for the machinery over there, there has been overwhelming support to implement a policy to revoke non-functional CAs, if they have been non-functional for a long period of time. So, that's the situation in the RIPE region.

The applicability to the AfrinIC region currently doesn't exist because AfrinIC does not support self-hosted or delegated CAs. In the ARIN region, it's not yet clear whether a policy proposal actually is needed or whether ARIN can implement a similar mechanism under existing certification practice statements, so that is a bit TBD, and I await more feedback from ARIN staff on how to proceed in that manner.

And in the LACNIC region, delegators/CAs, there's not yet general availability, and I'm in touch with LACNIC staff on whether this practice of cleaning up non-functional CAs would fall under existing terms and conditions or whether they would like to see a policy to ratify the mandate. So, that also is TBD. Next slide, please.

So, the solution I envision. It is fairly easy to objectively measure whether a CA is functional or not. A certification authority in the RPKI context is only functional if there is a valid and current manifest, and if no valid current manifest has been observed for more than 60 days, we define that certification authority as non-functional, and APNIC should revoke the resource certificates associated with that certification authority.

Now, over the course of those 60 days, APNIC should make reasonable efforts to discover the manifest, so you know, attempts should be made from multiple vantage points on the incident where not a single validator can obtain a current valid manifest.

APNIC should also inform the resource holder, like, "hey, we cannot discover a valid manifest, and if this situation persists for 60 days, the certificate will be revoked." And to clarify, this policy proposal does not target National Internet Registries or NIRs. It has been mentioned in the mailing list

discussions, hey, should NIRs be part of this policy proposal? And I would argue that we should first gain more experience with the proposal as is, and at a later point in time, assess whether it's worth adding, broadening the scope to include NIRs. The reason being is that in my measurements of the ecosystem -- I've been looking at the ecosystem for a number of years now -- the NIRs are never persistently broken. They are not the issue I'm trying to tackle. It is really individual LARs that fairly often end up in a situation that is persistently broken. It is never NIRs. So, the policy proposal excludes NIRs and for this version, I would encourage the community to proceed without including any NIRs in the scope. Then maybe in one or two years after we've seen how revocation of persistently non-functional LAR CAs works, then we can decide what to do.

The advantages of this policy proposal are that it cleans up digital objects that offer no value to the ecosystem. So, it persistently, non-functional CA, there are no ROAs that can be obtained through that broken CA because the CA is broken, so there's no loss of information from a route decision-making perspective because the broken CAs do not contribute ROAs into the routing system.

Validator synchronization becomes more economic because they don't need to connect forever to end points that are broken. It helps clean up syslogging. As I said, there can be hundreds of thousands of syslog messages about a tiny set of broken CAs. If you take the global perspective into account. And this is a minor inconvenience for broken CA operators, because they're broken anyway, so the revocation doesn't really change the situation for them because the setup was not working anyway.

And of course, if a resource holder wants to retry the self-hosted setup, they are free to just retry the onboarding procedure. So, the goal is not to permanently ban entities from running a self-hosted CA, if it was broken from 60 days. It just means, like after 60 days, the configuration is cleaned up, and if they want to retry running their own self-hosted CA, then they should just do the enrollment procedure again. So, yeah, there's no material inconvenience for affected parties.

And this doesn't concern a lot of parties. It's, in the APNIC region, I estimated it's only ten entities at this point in time. Next slide, please.

Disadvantages. I find it hard to come up with disadvantages, but one thing that came to mind is that maybe a resource holder requires more than 60 days to set up their configuration, but on the other hand, experience has taught us that this type of -- setting up this type of configuration usually is a matter of a few minutes. So, if it takes more than 60 days, it might mean there is a gap in capacity or some skill

building is needed or a documentation issue. And in such cases, it would be good if the affected resource holder is in touch with APNIC staff, which would happen if APNIC warns the resource holder, like, hey, it's not working for a long period of time. We are about to revoke it. In such scenarios, maybe APNIC can assist the affected resource holder, and this would resolve the issue one way or another. Because this proposal is not about discouraging self-hosted setups; it's about discouraging persistently non-functional self-hosted setups. Next slide, please.

The impact, according to the Secretariat, is fairly minimal. Some software updates are required to implement monitoring for this type of situation and automating warnings and eventual revocation if the situation is not rectified. Members may ask questions about what the emails mean about the revocation, but I don't expect the impact to be large because there's only a small number of affected parties. And there are some legal documents that would need updating.

And I think the burden of work for APNIC, being small, is reflected in the fact that the secretariat has indicated it would probably take about three months to implement this. Next slide, please.

If you want to take a look at current non-functional CAs, you can go to the following URL. It is updated every few hours, and it indicates the moment in time a CA became non-functional, so you can see that some of the CAs have been broken for almost a year, which means that by now they have caused millions of lock messages to be locked in millions of validators around the world.

And if you have any questions about this website or what specific data fields mean, then please reach out to me. I'm happy to also share the raw data for your own analysis, if you're interested in doing this. Next slide, please.

So, the summary. This policy is only about things that are broken or non-functional, so they are not contributing anything to the route decision making processes on the Internet, and I consider it cleaning up things that are not working properly for a long period of time a healthy habit. The policy proposal doesn't seem to be causing APNIC a lot of work.

It is good to be cognizant of the fact that this policy proposal positively impacts all validator instances, not only inside the APNIC region, but also outside the APNIC region, because there are many, many relying parties that are using the APNIC trust anchor but are not part of the APNIC service region, so this really is a policy proposal that has a positive global impact.

And as I mentioned, I think that it does not have

operational impact because it's about cleaning up things that are not working anyway. Next slide, please. So, with that, I open the floor for questions. I guess the Chair will assign the microphone to people that have questions.

>> Yes, we have a question online, right? Melody, please.

>> MELODY BENDINDANG: Hi, everyone. This is a comment from Ying-Chu Chen, on the record. This is for the room to be aware. "I support this proposal, but I suggest clarifying whether the 60 days refers to calendar days or working days. If working days are intended, it would also have to specify how holidays are treated." Thank you.

>> JOB SNIJDERS: Thank you for the question. The intent of this policy, it was written with calendar days in mind. This is to simplify calculations for all parties involved, so 60 calendar days, and figuring out working days would be a challenge, especially in such a large region as the APNIC region. I hope this clarifies your question.

>> MELODY BENDINDANG: Thank you, Aftab Siddiqui.

>> AFTAB SIDDIQUI: Thank you, Job. Thank you for doing it early in the morning. And someone who has to rotate the logs every day and with the possibility of missing some nice information out of those logs because so much used the stuff in it. I totally, wholeheartedly support this idea, but I have questions for the secretariat.

So, the problem is, is I would like to understand which policy was use to change the publication window from 30 to whatever it is right now. What policy was used to create self-hosted CAs in the first place?

>> DAVE PHELAN: Dave Phelan, APNIC Secretariat. It is not a policy, not a document, it is our certification practices statement and our RPKI TOC. These are not numbered documents.

>> AFTAB SIDDIQUI: Thank you for that. And with that in mind, I would suggest that RPKI is a critical service operated by APNIC and other RIRs quite nicely, with some glitches here and there, once a year or two. That should not be tinkered with policy. It's a critical service. People are members and community can provide feedback, saying this should be done, and secretariat, on the basis of how to run the critical service, as they know pretty well, should make those decisions on its own, rather than doing -- setting a precedent to change this through a policy is not a good idea. As a service run by the RIR, APNIC in this region and should be dealt with it accordingly. It is an absolutely good proposal but should not be coming through a policy proposal, should be coming as a service change request to the secretariat, and secretariat, based on whatever and how they want to implement it, they can come back with some recommendations and can do it. It should not be done through the

policy proposal. That's my strong argument on that.

>> DAVE PHELAN: Dave Phelan again. You opened the door on this when you did the AS 0 TAL. RPK was brought into the remit of policy.

>> AFTAB SIDDIQUI: It was not a service available at that time. It's a new service. It's a new TAL, and it was creating an additional TAL.

>> JOB SNIJDERS: I like that we can blame Aftab for the situation, but you know, we've come full circle. If I may respond, Aftab.

>> DAVE PHELAN: Please.

>> JOB SNIJDERS: I don't necessarily disagree with your perspective or your question, like, hey, should this be policy or not, because it is really a good question. Like, is this part of the normal service offering, where some degree of common sense should be applied. And APNIC as custodian of the trust anchor operations should, out of its own volition, revoke things that are persistently broken, or is this something where the community needs to provide input and make a decision and come to some consensus?

And I don't have the answer, to be honest. I have noticed that the sentiment seems to differ from region to region. So, for instance, feedback from RIPE NCC staff will be like, well, a policy proposal that is shepherded through the Routing Working Group, would just be an unambiguous signal from the community that they want us to revoke non-functional RPKI CAs. Then okay, we'll start a policy proposal in the working group.

In talking with APNIC staff, some indicated that a policy proposal would help establish clear mandate and that this route would be a viable route, but that doesn't take away from your analysis that, hey, is a policy proposal actually needed?

My goal is that, somehow, we start revoking persistently non-functional CAs. And I personally don't care if this is accomplished with a policy proposal or accomplished through some other means.

And then, in the North American region, the initial response from staff members was that it should not be accomplished through a policy proposal, but it should be accomplished as part of normal operating procedures. So, I think in the global context, is the policy needed, yes or no? Opinions differ based on the region. And I would love to know how we can accomplish the desired outcome of revoking persistently broken things, so I guess I relegate back to the chairs.

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: Thank you, Job. Just a quick clarification. It's within the Policy SIG Charter: "These include policies for resource allocation, recovery and transfer and resource, RPKI and related services. So, if you don't want

RPKI to be dealt with policy, maybe we should amend the Policy SIG charter.

>> AFTAB SIDDIQUI: We are stretching the operational service versus what else you have mentioned. So, this is a legal document and the services to the self-hosted CA is through the CPAs, so, that's a big stretch of saying we can discuss. Of course, we can discuss. And I mean, as secretariat, nicely pointed out, the AR zero policy, it was creating the rollout and that's why it was discussed in the policy. Not running a AS 0 TAL came back from the secretariat. I never wanted to have a separate TAL. So, for me, it's a critical service, and the operations of that critical service should be managed by the secretariat or the APNIC engineering team and suggest, based on the goal which Job has suggested, which is 100% current, they should implement it straight away, without the need for a policy proposal.

>> Thank you so much. Please state your name and affiliation.

>> Alex, talking for myself. For me, this is more of a housekeeping technical on how to manage RPKI. So, policy or not, I'm more like it should not be on policy. One question is why we are talking about, like, 60 days, 2 months, whether it is working days or not, where this number is coming from? Because what I heard is, like, only a few people or a few CAs would like more than one year.

>> JOB SNIJDERS: If I understood your question correctly, you're wondering where 60 days comes from. The goal of this policy is to only target persistently broken configurations. So, if a CA makes a small mistake and is down for a few hours, this policy should not affect them. I don't want for APNIC to revoke CAs after minor blips in their operation. So, a period of time was chosen that is lengthy. And if the CA is non-functional for more than 60 days, this policy activates, and this allows certification operation to be down for short periods of time, shorter than 60 days. And my using 60 days becomes very clear that it's about things that are broken for a long period of time. But in my mind, 30 days would also be appropriate, but yeah, you have to pick a number that is not infinite, and 60 days is better than the current situation, which is infinite days.

>> AFTAB SIDDIQUI: So, it's mostly arbitrary.

>> JOB SNIJDERS: It's not entirely arbitrary. I think that if something is down for 60 days, we can conclude that it's down. And if something is down for a few minutes, it's like a measurement mistake or a transient glitch, so to some degree there's a bit of arbitrariness, but on the other hand, 60 days gives us reassurances that it's really, really, really down and

has been for a long time.

>> SHAILA SHARMIN: Thanks for the clarification. We will take an online comment or question.

>> MELODY BENDINDANG: This is Melody from APNIC. I have a comment for the record. It's from Gaurav Kansal, who wants to make a point that he agrees with Aftab's point. Thank you.

>> SHAILA SHARMIN: Thank you. So, Terry, you're next.

>> TERRY SWEETSER: Terry Sweetser. I'll be Chair of the Routing Security SIG here at APNIC. Just to add to the information here, Job's data is very, very interesting. If you have a look at it, you'll see that there's approximately 48,000 manifests published worldwide right now. My estimation is 120 of them are non-functional, so do the math, it's a very small percentile, but that doesn't make it any less important.

RPKI really does need to be a system engineered for 100% utility, 100% of the time. So, any non-functional CRL, any non-functional CA is a problem, so we should be working towards something that cleans up that system. From what I can tell right now, if you're offline for four to eight hours, that's minimal impact on RPKI, but if you're offline for two years, that's nonsensical. So, I will say right now that this policy, whether it's in the right place or not, is absolutely necessary. It's a strongly agree from me, and I'll say also that we're not the only ones talking about this. The RPKI Working Group at NRO are working on their own document to do this, and I'm working on an Internet draft together with the IGF as well to establish a BCP for the operation of CAs, which would apply to registries, NIRs, and delegated CAs as well. So, yeah, please, everyone, do a strongly agree/agree on this one, and we'll start working on our friends at ARIN and other places as well to get this cleaned up. Yep. I'm looking at the right people, aren't I? Good.

And yes, Aftab, it's not the best place to do this, but it's one forum out of many and we should just pursue it as best we can.

>> SHAILA SHARMIN: Thank you, Terry. I will take our last two comments.

>> TAIJI KIMURA: Hello. Taiji from JPNIC, personal capacity. I have two comments. Basically -- no, no, not basically -- I fully agree with this proposal. One comment is that for floor, I think, once we launch RPKI service, we get access from worldwide, and this issue Job raised experienced for every client. His expression is build a kind of ecosystem, but it means that everyone accessing or using RPKI worldwide.

The second thing is that the recovery process or method is very clean and light. Even the CA is revoked, we can recover with very easy way, just setting up a new CA with new key. If this has any limitation or any suspension period, they could

change the story. But in this proposal, it's very right. So, basically, I agree with this proposal. Thank you.

>> SHAILA SHARMIN: Thanks, Taiji. Thanks for your insight. We will take the last speaker.

>> AFTAB SIDDIQUI: Just to make it clear, I 100% support the idea. I do not support the proposal. The idea should be implemented by the secretariat itself, should not go through the proposal. So, the proposal here in the Policy SIG, I do not support that.

>> SHAILA SHARMIN: Thank you. I think, like, we got all the questions and answers, so this policy proposal has been discussed at APNIC Policy SIG mailing list and at today's OPM. And APNIC PDP requires the community to reach consensus or general agreement on the proposal before it can be proposed, proceed. So, I will now make it consensus call. Before starting the consensus call, please login to Confer to participate. You will be given an opportunity now to indicate whether you strongly support this proposal, support this proposal, neutral, or you object to this proposal or strongly object to the proposal.

If you indicate that you strongly oppose to this proposal, then you will be expected to explain, if you still haven't, for your strong objection.

So, if you strongly support this proposal, please raise your hand. If you support this proposal, please raise your hand. If you are neutral to this proposal, please raise your hand. If you are opposing this proposal, please raise your hand. If you are strongly opposing this proposal, please raise your hand.

So, I think we already got explanation for our strongly oppose, so now I will discuss/confer with my co-chairs and then come back. Sunny, you want to share something?

>> SRINIVAS CHENDI: Yes, Sunny from secretariat. There is a suggestion for policy proposal, so you should work through that one before you address the consensus call. I don't know if you heard me or not, but you need to work through that strong opposition for this proposal before you declare your consensus call. Thank you.

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: That's exactly what we did.

>> DAVE PHELAN: Sorry, Dave from secretariat again. Don't forget, if this does reach consensus here, Aftab, the EC can also nix it as well, so.

>> Chairs? Can I --

>> SHAILA SHARMIN: Yes, please continue.

>> AFTAB SIDDIQUI: Yes. That's what's happening -- that is the problem I am having right now. If Secretariat can confirm on the mic that they will not be able to implement it unless there is a policy proposal for this. Can they confirm -- the APNIC

Services team can confirm, they cannot implement this unless there is a policy proposal?

>> SHAILA SHARMIN: We will be taking some time to discuss about it more.

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: We have the results of the consensus already. It's just a matter of having a confirmation from secretariat now. I don't know how long it's going to take, because we will be running a bit late.

(Speaking off microphone)

>> May I? (?) I think if called the consensus already and if we can see the result on the screen, and we can, and we've got part of the room what they want, but the challenge is that it should go the policy or --

>> AUDIENCE: I think we can decide later on, right?

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: From the Chair point of view, your strong opposition is not for the content of the proposal.

>> AFTAB SIDDIQUI: No, absolutely not.

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: That's the thing. Usually, with a strong opposition, the consensus call doesn't go, but in this case, it is still within the Policy SIG Charter to implement, or not, policies relating to RPKI. So, because of that, your strong opposition is not on the content, but on how it's going to be.

For me, the consensus is reached.

>> I think we can discuss. Part of the discussion in the other session is that what will be discussed in the Policy SIG and what can be done directly with the secretariat. But for the timing, I think we should proceed now.

>> DAVE PHELAN: We can do it without a policy, but we could also do AS0 without a policy, yet, here we are.

>> Sorry, I need to comment on that one, because pretty personal on that one. So, the first part's resolve the whole issue. That can be implemented. I mean, once it goes back to AMM, I would recommend all members to not make a precedent.

Now, going back to the AS 0 ROA policy it was a ROA creation policy, not tinkering with the services offering. Secretariat came back with the offering that we should create a separate TAL. It was during the implementation, never proposed by me. It's in the policy. So, don't try to mix it up. It was the secretariat's suggestion during the implementation that we will create a separate TAL, we'll not make it part of the existing one, whatever the implementation reason there is at that point. So, conflating two things together.

But the third point is, secretariat can implement it without a policy. But since the consensus has been reached, it will go to the AMM, and it would recommend to the EC, let's not set the precedent for doing things on operations through the policy.

>> SHAILA SHARMIN: Yes, that would be the best decision. Like, as we already have seen, this proposal has reached into the consensus. And as the next step in the PDP is to take the proposal to the APNIC Members Meeting and seek a continued consensus call. The proposal will then be posted back to the mailing list for a four-week comment period, and if required, the period will be extended up to eight weeks. Thank you so much. Thank you, Job, for submitting this proposal. I'll hand it over to Ching-Heng, and Dave will do the impact assessment for the next proposal.

>> CHING-HENG KU: So, we welcome Dave to -- proposal 164.

>> DAVE PHELAN: Okay, this is less controversial. Secretariat Impact Analysis for prop-164 version 4. This is actually on version 2, but we're presenting for version 4. Version 3, I'm not sure where that disappeared to. Allocation of IPv6 Resources longer than a /32 with the nimble boundary alignment. This impact assessment was for version 2, but version 4 is being presented today.

Generally, we've assessed that there be roughly 3,100 resource holders that would qualify for this change. This would create an increased workload with Member Services team, with assignments being swapped out for allocations and members returning portions of their existing allocations.

In terms of implementation, we would obviously need to change APNIC-127 policy text, and obviously, we would have to follow the Document Editorial Policy. There will be several systems changes within registry to implement the time frame would be approximately six months subject to the call for editorial comments.

>> CHING-HENG KU: Thanks, Dave. So, we welcome Christopher to the stage to introduce this proposal 164.

>> CHRISTOPHER HAWKER: Hello, everyone. You'll have to forgive me, I'm a little bit frozen here in the room. Hopefully, we can get out shortly. Okay, so, my name is Christopher Hawker. Okay. So, my name's Christopher Hawker. I'm from Sydney, Australia. In conjunction with my industry colleague, Luke Thompson, also from Sydney, we've formulated prop-164: Allocations of IPv6 Resources longer than a /32 with a nibble boundary environment.

Okay, so, the Problem Statement: Currently, if a member receives an assignment longer than a /32, I myself hold a 44 assignment -- they cannot make sub-assignments for their customers or internal areas within their organization and maintain accurate WHOIS records -- maintain accurate records of longer prefixes regarding those sub-assignments within WHOIS and RDAP. If they want to properly document sub-assignments and update WHOIS, they are required to request a /32, which may be

in excess of their operational requirements and lead to underutilized address space. Maintaining accurate records is critical to ensure the stability and secure management of the Internet Number Resources system.

Now, the objective of this policy change is to reduce the minimum allocation size from a /32 to a /36. This is to reduce the minimum amount of resources which a member has to apply for, which, in turn, reduces the allocation of resources which are unnecessary and allows them to maintain more accurate WHOIS and RDAP records.

Okay, so, the current situation in other regions. At the moment, what we've been able to identify is that ARIN already allows for /36 and /40 prefix delegations under section 6.5.2.1 of their Number Resource Policy Manual. LACNIC, RIPE NCC and AfriNIC policies all still list the /32 as the minimum allocation size.

Okay, so, the proposed policy solution. What we're looking to do is update APNIC 127 Internet Number Resource Policies per the below. To Section 5.2.3.1, LIR-to-ISP allocation, we'd like to add a new line that reads "When an LIR makes a delegation to an ISP with whom they are directly connected, they must update the WHOIS Database with the relevant delegation details," as we as APNIC members would update our own records with APNIC.

Section 8.1: Minimum IPv6 allocation. This is simply just to modify the text to read that "the minimum allocation size for IPv6 address space is /36," instead of the current /32.

Returning excess IPv6 allocations. Now, we've had some feedback on this. Originally, it was a member could return any /36 out of -- or keep any 36 out of the 32 that they've held. We've since updated this, that it reads "if an account holder has been allocated a /32 or shorter, they will be eligible to return the balance of their allocation, reducing their allocation size to a /36. If a member has a /32 or larger IPv6 allocation, they may reduce it to a /36 by keeping the first /36 out of that block and returning all other space.

Section 8.2.1: Account holders with existing IPv4 space. We'd like to replace the text "an account holder that has IPv4 allocation is eligible for a /32 IPv6 address block" with "an account holder that has an IPv4 allocation is eligible for a /36 IPv6 address block."

Now, the advantages of this proposal. This would allow for members to maintain more accurate records for longer prefixes from a delegation within the WHOIS Database and allows for longer -- and allowing for longer allocations would help prevent the unnecessary delegation of shorter ones so that members can request allocations that better align with their addressing requirements.

Now, some people say that we have more /32s in the entire IPv6 address space globally than we'll ever need. But going back 20-30 years ago, we said the same thing about IPv4. We've got more than enough space that will allow us to go on. We can't treat IPv6 in the same way.

Now, some disadvantages we've identified. This had the potential to lead to the announcement of additional routes into the global routing table. However, networks already announce routes up to and including a /48, so this disadvantage is expected to be minimal, if a disadvantage at all. And during the Secretariat Impact Analysis, they did identify that they don't anticipate or expect the number of announcements to increase, given that address space returns would be replaced with the new address space.

Impact on resource holders. We anticipate any impact on resource holders because that would have unused space and return to /36 if they have to. They don't have to return space and they may retain it, if they wish.

Now, the references for this. We obviously referred to the various sections in APNIC-127 Internet Number Resource Policies, as well as ARIN's Number Resource Policy Manual.

>> CHING-HENG KU: Okay, thanks, Christopher. Now we open the mic for any comments, suggestions, or questions. Please go to the mic.

>> AUDIENCE: Three questions. Personal capacity. Just a quick point of clarification. While the prop was put on, is this just an amendment to the WHOIS part of it or the whole allocation policy? Because it seems the intent of the policy is just so you are able to manage the sub-delegations in the WHOIS.

>> CHRISTOPHER HAWKER: Okay. So, the intent of this policy is to reduce the minimum allocation size from /32 to a /36, and maintaining accurate -- and that's to allow for the maintenance of accurate WHOIS information or more accurate than what it currently is. Because if a member has a /32 assignment, for example -- or sorry, a /36 assignment, they can only update the /36 in WHOIS. They can't make sub-allocations or sub-assignments in WHOIS from assignments.

>> Thank you.

>> CHING-HENG KU: We have some comments online.

>> MELODY BENDINDANG: This is Melody from APNIC. On behalf of Liam Stephens on Zoom, in his personal capacity. Thanks, Chris, for the proposal. My question is for the secretariat. Will this impact the processes for APNIC? For example, does APNIC currently organize allocations based on size, for example?

>> LIAM STEPHENS: I'll read the question out. Liam Stephens in my own personal capacity. Thanks, Chris, for the proposal. Will this impact management practices for APNIC, i.e.,

does APNIC currently organize allocations based on size? For instance, 2001 column 200/23 has mainly 32 blocks, whereas 2001 C0023 has mainly 28.

>> (?) from APNIC. So, we have split /12 to two blocks, one to make smaller and one to make larger, so this will affect the smaller delegations, the /32s, but the only change would be we will drop the size from /32 to /36.

>> LIAM STEPHENS: Thank you.

>> CHING-HENG KU: Is there any more comments? Okay.

>> Hello, Jin from CNNIC. So, my question, even with the /32 delegation, you still can, you know, register the WHOIS for /36. So, we have enough IPv6 addresses, so why do we need to make a delegation too?

(Off microphone)

>> CHRISTOPHER HAWKER: If I understand the question correctly -- please correct me if I'm wrong. If you have the minimum allocation size, you can reserve it's a /32. Now, if you receive an assignment of longer than a /32 via 36, you can't create the WHOIS data from that 36, i.e., a /38. This is trying to address that by allowing people to take smaller space, which then allows them to create smaller records and allows them to maintain more accurate information.

>> AUDIENCE: Okay, thank you.

>> CHING-HENG KU: Some question, please?

>> MATTHEW ENGER: Matthew Enger from Leaptel in Australia. The/36, is that aligning with a /32 from a cost point of view?

>> CHRISTOPHER HAWKER: Within the policy, we can't discuss that. It's outside of the scope. But yes, short answer is yes.

>> CHING-HENG KU: So, if there is no other question onsite or online, so this proposal has been discussed, so we will make the consensus call. If you strongly support this proposal, please raise your hand. Thank you. If you support this proposal, please raise your hand. Okay, thanks. If you are neutral about this proposal, please raise your hand. Okay, thanks. If you oppose this proposal, please raise your hand. Thank you. If you strongly oppose this proposal, please raise your hand. Okay, thanks. So, we will discuss with chairs and...

>> CHING-HENG KU: Aftab, if you can speak.

>> AFTAB SIDDIQUI: I want to ask everyone who is opposing it, ask why you are opposing it. At least give the opportunity for the author to say why you are opposing it. Opposition for the sake of it, I'm not about that. Now you have strong opposition, so it's kind of interesting. Usually, it doesn't happen like that here. So, if you have an opposition -- I mean, you can have a general opposition. I'm fine. But at least come and explain what the opposition is. Thank you.

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: Thanks, Aftab. And yes, we do need

feedback, or the authors do need feedback to improve the proposal, if needed.

>> CHING-HENG KU: So, as the community did not reach a consensus, so this proposal will be sent back to the mailing list and also can consider more feedback from the community. Thanks, Christopher.

>> CHRISTOPHER HAWKER: Thank you. If I may say one thing before I step down from the mic. Those that do have an objection to this policy, I would definitely love to get feedback from you, because for me and my co-authors to be able to improve it, it's one thing to look at it and say what we can amend, but it's another thing to get feedback from the community on how we can amend it so we can reach a wider consensus. So, hopefully, I'll look forward to meeting you in the hallways, on the mailing list. For those who have my email address, feel free to reach out directly and we'll see what we can do. But again, thank you very much.

>> CHING-HENG KU: Thanks, Christopher. Thank you.

(Applause)

>> BERTRAND CHERRIER: Okay, and this concludes this Open Policy Meeting Session 2. Sorry we are running a bit late, but it was a very interesting meeting. So, enjoy your lunch, and see you at the APNIC Member Meeting.

(Session concluded at 1:12 p.m. ICT)

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