## Detecting Internet Routing Outages with Topology and Service analysis

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
## Routing Outages Cause Internet Problems Worldwide

#### The Internet is interdependent

- Application delivery is dependent on many Internet Service Providers.
- CDN, DNS, public cloud work together to provide exceptional digital experiences.

#### Outages can happen at any time, anywhere

- IXP outage, cloud outage, transit key point outage.
- Natural disasters, misconfiguration, network attacks, router overloads can lead to outage.
- Affect people's normal life, Organization lost revenue, reputational damage, even take entire network offline.



## Internet Routing Outages Incidents are Increasing

## Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram suffer worldwide outage







BUSINGS All Industry Technology Transport Retail

#### KT suffers major network outage nationwide

By Kim Da-sol

Amazon Web Services' third outage in a month exposes a weak point in the

Economy Updated on Oct 4, 2021 1:33 PM EST - Published on Oct 4, 2021 12:59 PM EST

internet's backbone

By Aaron Gregg, Drew Harwell, The Washington Post Updated: December 23, 2021 Published: December 23, 2021

[Update: Jan. 11] Spectrum internet outage troubles many users



### Global Telia Outage Disrupts Popular Internet Services

Major customer says carrier reliability poor over last 60 days

#### CenturyLink L3 outage knocks out web giants and 3.5% of all internet traffic

Cloudflare fingers intertwined BGP and Flowspec SNAFUs

Simon Sharwood, APAC Editor Mon 31 Aug 2020 // 00:49 UTC


## Three Large-scale Internet Routing Outages Events

Event	Time and Duration	Root cause	Impacts
Facebook Outage	October 4, 2021, between 15:40 and 22:45 UTC for more than seven hours.	Routine maintenance rendered its DNS servers unusable, cutting off Facebook's entire backbone network from its data centers.	Facebook and its other platforms, including Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger, went down globally for close to six hours.
KT Outage	October 25, 2021, between 2:16 and 2:56 UTC for approximately 40 minutes.	In a statement, the telco said it initially suspected a DDoS attack due to traffic overload but after it scrutinised the matter it found that the cause was a routing error.	The telco's subscribers were unable to use their credit cards, trade stocks, or access apps, while some large commercial websites were also shut down during that period.
CenturyLink Outage	August 30, 2020, between 10:04 and 15:30 UTC for approximately five and a half hours.	Misconfiguration, the outage was caused by an offending Flowspec announcement that prevented BGP from correctly establishing.	Takes down Cloudflare, Reddit, Hulu, AWS, Blizzard, Steam, Xbox Live, Discord, and dozens more. A 3.5% drop in global web traffic.

# What's Happening during the Facebook Outage Event?

Important applications and DNS authoritative resolution service are centralized in AS32934!


- AS32934 BGP Withdraw and Announcement updates surged.
- Faecbook's DNS Authoritative server prefixes were withdrawed by many ASes.
- Some other important applications went down.
- The whole process lasted 20 minutes.
- It took six hours to recover.



AS202297 withdraw 129.134.30.0/23 at 2021-10-04 15:42:17 AS202297 withdraw 185.89.218.0/23 at 2021-10-04 15:42:26 AS61292 withdraw 185.89.218.0/23 at 2021-10-04 15:42:47 AS34927 withdraw 185.89.218.0/23 at 2021-10-04 15:42:47 AS61218 withdraw 185.89.218.0/23 at 2021-10-04 15:42:47 AS61292 withdraw 185.89.218.0/23 at 2021-10-04 15:42:49 AS34927 withdraw 185.89.218.0/23 at 2021-10-04 15:42:49 AS7018 withdraw 185.89.218.0/23 at 2021-10-04 15:42:50 AS57199 withdraw 185.89.218.0/23 at 2021-10-04 15:42:50 AS57199 withdraw 185.89.218.0/23 at 2021-10-04 15:42:59 AS58057 withdraw 185.89.218.0/23 at 2021-10-04 15:43:11 AS58057 withdraw 185.89.218.0/23 at 2021-10-04 15:43:11 AS174 withdraw 185.89.218.0/23 at 2021-10-04 15:43:36 AS61292 withdraw 129.134.30.0/23 at 2021-10-04 15:43:43 AS34927 withdraw 129.134.30.0/23 at 2021-10-04 15:43:50 AS20205 withdraw 185.89.218.0/23 at 2021-10-04 15:43:55 AS1403 withdraw 185.89.218.0/23 at 2021-10-04 15:43:55 AS1603 withdraw 185.89.218.0/23 at 2021-10-04 15:43:59 AS58057 withdraw 129.134.30.0/23 at 2021-10-04 15:43:59

AS202365 withdraw 129.134.30.0/23 at 2021-10-04 16:07:33 AS202365 withdraw 185.89.218.0/23 at 2021-10-04 16:07:33 AS49752 withdraw 185.89.218.0/23 at 2021-10-04 16:07:34 AS49752 withdraw 129.134.30.0/23 at 2021-10-04 16:07:34 AS202365 withdraw 185.89.218.0/23 at 2021-10-04 16:07:34 AS202365 withdraw 129.134.30.0/23 at 2021-10-04 16:07:34 AS139589 withdraw 185.89.218.0/23 at 2021-10-04 16:07:34 AS139589 withdraw 129.134.30.0/23 at 2021-10-04 16:07:34 AS17639 withdraw 129.134.30.0/23 at 2021-10-04 16:07:50 AS17639 withdraw 185.89.218.0/23 at 2021-10-04 16:07:50 AS49673 withdraw 129.134.30.0/23 at 2021-10-04 16:08:01 AS49673 withdraw 185.89.218.0/23 at 2021-10-04 16:08:01 AS34800 withdraw 129.134.30.0/23 at 2021-10-04 16:08:49 AS34800 withdraw 185.89.218.0/23 at 2021-10-04 16:08:49 AS34800 withdraw 129.134.30.0/23 at 2021-10-04 16:08:49 AS34800 withdraw 185.89.218.0/23 at 2021-10-04 16:08:49 AS44393 withdraw 129.134.30.0/23 at 2021-10-04 16:08:49 AS44393 withdraw 185.89.218.0/23 at 2021-10-04 16:08:49 AS44393 withdraw 129.134.30.0/23 at 2021-10-04 16:08:49 AS44393 withdraw 185.89.218.0/23 at 2021-10-04 16:08:49

## IP of Alexa Top 30 Websites' Authoritative DNS Servers



(The servers' IP measured from five servers worldwide on October 10, 2021, and aggregated by prefix, AS) <sup>6</sup>


## What We Learned from these Outage Events?

BGP and DNS are critical infrastructure of the network. Any configuration operations should be strictly audited and validated. Multi-dimensional IP database is very necessary for route filtering.

Critical network infrastructure such as DNS authority servers and critical services should have redundant backup mechanisms and should not all be placed in a single prefix or AS.

The BGP anomaly monitoring system should not only focus on the false positive rate and false negative rate, but also on the sensitivity of prefixes and AS. When a anomaly detected, we should know whether the prefix or AS contains important services.

## **BGP** Outage Detection Architecture



A real-time global topology is maintained in memory and checking the visibility of prefixes and AS in vantage points' routing table, then observe whether these outage prefixes contain sensitive services and whether outage ASes have aggregation in the country's topology.

## What IP Address and AS are Sensitive?

#### **IP Address**

- Country's top websites
- DNS server, PoP router
- Industrial system
- Finance, banking, energy, government services







#### AS

- IDC
- Cloud
- IXP
- •



### How to Build the Database?

#### Crawling, probing and analysing

- Crawl important sites, get their IP addresses and content, and then analyse the type of site based on the content (e.g., government, bank, financial institution).
- Probe and get the authoritative DNS server's IP addresses of important web sites from different locations.
- Analyze common service ports in passive network traffic or scan the whole IPv4 address space and get the common service ports.
- Analyse the type of AS from the textual semantics of the WHOIS database.

Domain name
eg. www.xxx.com

IP-Service mapping

Website IP
Authoritative DNS
server's IP

website's
title,keywords,description

website ywords,description

classification

website type
e.g., government, bank,
financial institution

### Forward DNS (FDNS)

DNS 'ANY', 'A', 'AAAA',
'TXT', 'MX', and 'CNAME'
responses for known
forward DNS names

aut-num: AS4815

as-name: CHINANET-IDC-SH

descr: China Telecom (Group)
descr: IDC center shanghai node

country: C

#### **TCP Scans**

SYN scan results for common TCP services across all of IPv4

#### **UDP Scans**

UDP scan results for common UDP services across all of IPv4

## Thank you!