

Demystifying AS0

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


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Number resource management



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




RPKI number resource management




RPKI Number Resource Management



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
RPKI number resource management



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
APNIC RPKI number resource management



- APNIC runs two independent RPKI systems:
 - Mainline and AS0
- AS0 ROA runs from a fully independent TA
 - Unlike mainline RPKI, there is no 'hosted' or 'NIR' or 'delegated' component
 - The only visible end product of AS0 is a ROA for AS0



APNIC RPKI number resource management



- This is what we're talking about today, mostly
- An optional TAL that configures an additional TA
- The additional TA enables visibility of the AS0 ROA



What we're going to try and cover



What we're going to try and cover

- What is AS0?
- What is RPKI, and the 'TAL' and ROAs? What is SLURM?
- What is an AS0 ROA and how is it made?
- What is the APNIC AS0 RPKI system, and the AS0 'TAL'?
- How does the APNIC AS0 ROA relate to resources overall?
- How does it differ from individual Internet number resource holders' AS0 ROA?
- How do I use a ROA? How do I use the AS0 ROA from APNIC
- What about the other RIRs or NIRs?
- What does the future hold for RPKI and AS0?

What is AS0?



AS0 by RFC

Codified in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7607

A BGP speaker MUST NOT originate or propagate a route with an AS number of zero in the AS_PATH, AS4_PATH, AGGREGATOR, or AS4 AGGREGATOR attributes.





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 - Cannot be used for identity or privacy
 - You are issued a CA certificate: you can make child certificates
 - Including End-Entity and CA certificates
 - End-Entity certificates to sign digital objects
 - CA certificates to sub-delegate RPKI to another system



- RPKI stands for Resource PKI (Public Key Infrastructure)
 - X.509 certificates, hierarchy from a 'trust anchor' (TA) (operated by the RIR)
 - Contains RFC 3779 encoded list of Internet number resources (INRs)
- You are issued a CA certificate: you can make child certificates
 - Including End-Entity and CA certificates
 - End-Entity certificates to sign digital objects
 - CA certificates to sub-delegate RPKI to another system
- PKI validation is about checking cryptography, checking path to a TA and checking policy conformance
 - RPKI policy is mainly about the INRs being properly covered by the parent



- TAL is the Trust Anchor Locator: how to find the TA for your PKI
 - Usually configured into your validator software
 - Can be hand-installed
 - Consists of a path to the TA certificate and its public key signature
- Route Origin Attestation (or Authorization) (ROAs), a signed object binding BGP Origin-AS to a list of prefixes
 - Relates to the RPSL Route: object in it's intent but has MaxLength
- SLURM: Simplified Local Internet Number Resource Management
 - A structured plaintext file which can be used to filter RPKI validated products
 - Can specify things that must be included and accepted as valid, irrespective of PKI validation



SLURM

- A simpler mechanism to specify post-validation states
- Not inherently cryptographically validated: it is not a signed object; it is a local override mechanism you apply to your own validation process
- We could have done this, and it was proposed in RIPE NCC, but we determined in policy discussion to go to a fully cryptographically provable system.
- There are IETF sidrops WG drafts discussing secure SLURM transport
 - This is still work in progress; SLURM itself remains an assertion, not provable



What is an AS0 ROA and how is it made?



AS0 as a ROA #1 of 3

Codified in <u>https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6483</u>

4. Disavowal of Routing Origination

A ROA is a positive attestation that a prefix holder has authorized an AS to originate a route for this prefix into the inter-domain routing system. It is possible for a prefix holder to construct an authorization where no valid AS has been granted any such authority to originate a route for an address prefix.

This is achieved by using a ROA where the ROA's subject AS is one that must not be used in any routing context. Specifically, AS 0 is reserved by the IANA such that it may be used to identify non-routed networks [IANA-AS].

A ROA with a subject of AS 0 (AS 0 ROA) is an attestation by the holder of a prefix that the prefix described in the ROA, and any more specific prefix, should not be used in a routing context.



AS0 as a ROA #2 of 3

Codified in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6483

The route validation procedure, described in <u>Section 2</u>, will provide a "valid" outcome if any ROA matches the address prefix and origin AS, even if other valid ROAs would provide an "invalid" validation outcome if used in isolation.

Consequently, an AS 0 ROA has a lower relative preference than any other ROA that has a routable AS as its subject.

This allows a prefix holder to use an AS 0 ROA to declare a default condition that any route that is equal to or more specific than the prefix to be considered "invalid", while also allowing other concurrently issued ROAs to describe valid origination authorizations for more specific prefixes.



AS0 as a ROA #3 of 3

Codified in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6483

By convention, an AS 0 ROA should have a maxLength value of 32 for IPv4 addresses and a maxlength value of 128 for IPv6 addresses; although, in terms of route validation, the same outcome would be achieved with any valid maxLength value, or even if the maxLength element were to be omitted from the ROA.

Also by convention, an AS 0 ROA should be the only ROA issued for a given address prefix; although again, this is not a strict requirement.

An AS 0 ROA may coexist with ROAs that have different subject AS values; although in such cases, the presence or lack of presence of the AS 0 ROA does not alter the route's validity state in any way.



How is it made?




How is it made?

- In MyAPNIC routing management, by selecting AS0 as the Origin-AS when defining a route
- In Krill or an NIR's system, or another RIR, or any other delegated RPKI system depends on how this exposes in the UI



Using MyAPNIC for route management









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Log Out							
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Link existing membership							
Resource Manager							
Voting							1
NETWORK OPERATIONS							
NetOX to solve routing issues							
DASH to secure your networks							
OTHER SERVICES							
Academy							
Training							
Blog							
Internet Directory							
Policy development							
















View your registered maintainers, and register new maintainers.

IRTs

View your registered IRT objects, and register new IRT objects.

Resource certification

RPKI

Reverse DNS Delegations

Add Reverse Delegations


Reverse Delegation Summary View and manage reverse delegations

Add new reverse delegations.

Set up your RPKI engine, and manage your Route Origin Authorization (ROA) objects.







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
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
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Summary

View all of your resource holdings.

Resource Manager | APN|C ×

IPv4

View your IPv4 resource holdings.

IPv6

View your IPv6 resource holdings.

AS Numbers

View your ASN resource holdings.

Reverse DNS Delegations

Resource Request Forms

Add Reverse Delegations Add new reverse delegations.

Reverse Delegation Summary

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Apply for an IPv4 address delegation.

Apply for an IPv6 address delegation.

Apply for an ASN delegation.

IPv4 Addresses

IPv6 Addresses

AS Numbers

Whois Updates

Add, update, and delete individual Whois objects.

Bulk Whois Updates Add, update, and delete multiple Whois objects.

Contact Details Update

Update contact details of the internet resources associated with your account.

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Route management

Routes

Add, update, delete and view routes. Create Route Origin Authorisation (ROA) for routes.

Resource Transfer/Return

Transfer Resources Into Another Account

Initiate a transfer of resources from your account to another account.

Receive Resources Into My Account

Receive resources transferred from another account to your account.

Request Transfer Pre-approval





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
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
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Prefix	192.168.1.0/24				/
Origin AS	ASO				a 2
Ho O MSA	/24				-
	🗹 Enabled				sts
Whois	Enabled				٦
	Define Whois route a	ttributes			
Options	Notify additional cont	tacts			J
_				Cancel Next	1
Review & Import	t from BGP Dismiss				
Create route D	elete selected				
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Deselect all					



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					_
Create route					×
Prefix	192.168.	1.0/24			
Origin AS	ASO				
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Options	🗌 Notify a	dditional contacts			
					Cancel Next
Review & Import	from BGP	Dismiss			
Create route De	lete selecte	d			
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Deselect all					



Some examples of AS0 ROA



AS0 ROA made by delegates

- An address holder can use an AS0 ROA to do two things
- 1. 'Disavow' a prefix they have no intention of asserting into BGP
 - Publish the AS0 ROA for the prefix; do not publish any other ROA
- 2. 'Turn on' RPKI for a range of resources and selectively announce specific prefixes
 - Publish the AS0 ROA for the covering prefix
 - Publish the more specific (or even identical) prefixes with valid Origin-AS
 - Longest match, and 'AS0-ROA has lowest priority' combine



An example

- DC-IX; hold address under RIPE NCC
 - None of these IX prefixes should be routed, they're for use in the IX only

ROA Version: 0 SigningTime: 2021-02-22T15:04:06Z asID: 0 addressFamily: 1 IPAddress: 185.1.48.0/24 IPAddress: 185.1.47.0/24 IPAddress: 185.1.46.0/24 IPAddress: 185.1.192.0/23 IPAddress: 80.81.192.0/21 IPAddress: 185.1.197.0/24 IPAddress: 80.81.203.0/24 IPAddress: 80.81.202.0/24 IPAddress: 185.1.8.0/24 IPAddress: 185.1.119.0/24 IPAddress: 185.1.131.0/24 IPAddress: 185.1.170.0/23

addressFamily: 2 IPAddress: 2001:7f8:44::/48 IPAddress: 2001:7f8:3f::/48 IPAddress: 2001:7f8:10a::/48 IPAddress: 2001:7f8:d5::/48 IPAddress: 2001:7f8:73::/48 IPAddress: 2001:7f8:9e::/48 IPAddress: 2001:7f8:32::/48 IPAddress: 2001:7f8:3d::/48 IPAddress: 2001:7f8:a0::/48 IPAddress: 2001:7f8:a0::/48 IPAddress: 2001:7f8:106::/48 IPAddress: 2001:7f8:36::/48



An example


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```
ROA Version:
               0
SigningTime:
              2021-02-22T15:04:06Z
asID:
           0
addressFamily: 1
  IPAddress: 185.1.48.0/24
   IPAddress: 185.1.47.0/24
   IPAddress: 165, 1, 40, 0/74
   IPAddress: 185.1.192.0/23
   IPAddress: 80.81.192.0/21
   IPAddress: 185.1.197.0/24
   IPAddress: 80.81.203.0/24
   IPAddress: 80.81.202.0/24
   IPAddress: 185.1.8.0/24
   IPAddress: 185.1.119.0/24
   IPAddress: 185.1.131.0/24
   IPAddress: 185.1.170.0/23
```

addressFamily: 2 IPAddress: 2001:7f8:44::/48 IPAddress: 2001:7f8:3f::/48 IPAddress: 2001:7f8:10a::/48 IPAddress: 2001:7f8:d5::/48 IPAddress: 2001:7f8:73::/48 IPAddress: 2001:7f8:9e::/48 IPAddress: 2001:7f8:3d::/48 IPAddress: 2001:7f8:3d::/48 IPAddress: 2001:7f8:106::/48 IPAddress: 2001:7f8:106::/48 IPAddress: 2001:7f8:106::/48

rpkiviz.zdns.cn

- Declaration is made by the delegate
- Diagnostic validator shows its position in the hierarchy
- Its down below the registry level, signed by the delegate



Another example

- Deutsche Telekom AG; hold address under RIPE NCC
 - We don't want these prefixes visible unless a ROA signed by us exists
 - Here's the ROA permitting AS3320 to originate

ROA Version: 0 SigningTime: 2021-01-01T01:01:13Z asID: 3320 addressFamily: 1 IPAddress: 80.144.0.0/13 IPAddress: 80.156.0.0/16 IPAddress: 62.156.0.0/14 IPAddress: 217.224.0.0/11 IPAddress: 80.128.0.0/11 IPAddress: 217.80.0.0/12 IPAddress: 46.80.0.0/12 IPAddress: 193.158.0.0/15 IPAddress: 62.153.0.0/16 IPAddress: 194.25.0.0/16 IPAddress: 217.0.0.0/13 IPAddress: 80.157.8.0/21

#apnic52

IPAddress: 80,157,0,0/16 IPAddress: 93.192.0.0/10 IPAddress: 84.128.0.0/10 IPAddress: 87.128.0.0/10 IPAddress: 79.192.0.0/10 IPAddress: 91.0.0.0/10 IPAddress: 62.224.0.0/14 IPAddress: 195.145.0.0/16 IPAddress: 62 154 0 0/15 IPAddress: 80.128.0.0/12 IPAddress: 80.157.16.0/20 IPAddress: 212.184.0.0/15 IPAddress: 195.243.0.0/16 IPAddress: 80.152.0.0/14

addressFamily: 2 IPAddress: 2003:3c0::/28 IPAddress: 2003:3e0::/28 IPAddress: 2003::/23 IPAddress: 2003::/19

This is the ROA for valid Origin: 3320



Another example

- Deutsche Telekom AG; hold address under RIPE NCC
 - We don't want these prefixes visible unless a ROA signed by us exists
 - (One of the prefixes is a superblock, a /11 over the /12 they do announce)

```
ROA Version: 0
SigningTime: 2021-01-01T01:01:11Z
asID: 0
addressFamily: 1
IPAddress: 80.128.0.0/11
```

This is the AS 0 ROA for one of the prefixes in the main ROA



What is the APNIC AS0 RPKI system, and the AS0 'TAL'?



What is the APNIC AS0 RPKI system, and the AS0 'TAL'?

- The APNIC AS0 RPKI system is a fully independent RPKI 'engine' operating under a distinct Trust Anchor
- This is why the AS0 TAL exists: it is kept outside of the main RPKI TAL so there is no confusion between the products
- By operating as a distinct TAL, we turned AS0 service from 'opt out' into 'opt in'
 - If we had constructed this service 'under' the main RPKI TAL then all BGP speakers would have been affected as soon as we started issuing AS0 ROA
- The system uses an independent codebase from the main RPKI
 - It's hosted in VMs and in Kubernetes, and uses APNIC code, and Krill (NLNet labs)



What is the APNIC AS0 RPKI system, and the AS0 'TAL'?

- The APNIC AS0 system is a stand-alone RPKI system, with its own TAL
 - It is not part of the main APNIC RPKI system; it validates independently
 - It operates under a different policy and process
- Stand-Alone to make sure it was not accidentally applied to BGP validation
 - You need to deliberately, consciously include the AS0 TAL in your validation software systems to see its products and to be affected by them



How does the APNIC AS0 ROA relate to resources overall?

- APNIC AS0 ROA only ever contains resources which are available or reserved
 - By definition, no resources which APNIC has delegated to anyone should continue to be on the AS0 ROA
- APNIC AS0 ROA only ever contains resources APNIC can show are managed by APNIC
 - We use the delegated statistics file as a configuration input to list the operational resources we have authority over, in the production CA systems below the TAL in both AS0 and in the main RPKI system



How does the APNIC AS0 ROA relate to resources overall?



How does it differ from individual INR holders AS0 ROA?

- An INR holder, or Delegate can elect to make any ROA they like (any Origin-AS, and combination of resources they have authority over)
- These AS0 ROA are made visible to anyone who has the APNIC RPKI TAL configured in their RPKI Validator
 - They are expected to apply to BGP filtering as soon as published
- They exist solely at the discretion and decision of the INR Delegate
- They cannot refer to any INR the publisher does not have authority over
 - They cannot refer to undelegated or reserved or available addresses



What should you do with these AS0 ROA?

- AS0 ROA made by delegates are assertions made directly by a delegate. They go to the primary defined role of an AS0 ROA in the RFC
- You should use these to determine acceptability of routes you see for these prefixes
 - If there is not a valid ROA over the prefix you see being announced, you should reject the prefix



How do I use a ROA? How do I use the AS0 ROA from APNIC

- You use a ROA by operating a validator as a relying-party
 - This produces a set of Validated ROA Payload (VRP)
 - A list of prefix and Origin-AS
 - You can use the VRP to filter BGP messages
 - Typically, by operating RPKI-RTR to process BGP updates, and define them as one of three states:
 - 1. Valid
 - 2. Invalid
 - 3. Unknown
- We recommend the APNIC AS0 ROA only be used for diagnostics and alerting



The APNIC AS0 Policy

<u>https://www.apnic.net/community/policy/resources#5.1.4.</u>

5.1.4. Preventing the Use of Undelegated APNIC Address Space

- Undelegated APNIC Address Space (IPv4 or IPv6) should not be publicly advertised by any Autonomous System. To prevent its use, APNIC will create RPKI ROAs with origin AS0 (AS zero) for all undelegated address space (marked as "Available" and "Reserved" in the delegated-apnic-extendedlatest stats file) for which it is the current administrator.
- While any current resource holder can create ASO ROA for the resources they have under their account administration, only APNIC has the authority to create ASO ROAs for APNIC address space not yet delegated to an organization. When APNIC delegates address space to an organization, APNIC will remove the prefix from the ASO ROA.



AS0 ROA made in the Registry

- APNIC does not assert a valid route for any resources except those delegated to the Secretariat for its own use, or for declared experiments (for example, final /8 checks on tainted blocks)
 - All undelegated, reserved, withheld, terminated and as-yet unissued resources are not routed
- APNIC has been directed by Prop132 to publish an AS0 ROA for undelegated and unassigned resources
 - Since we do not assert any valid origin-AS in BGP, the AS0 ROA we publish has the effect of 'repudiating' these routes from existing in the default-free zone



How APNIC manages the AS0 ROA

- "fast to remove"
 - Within 5 minutes of a Delegation being made, APNIC removes the prefix from the AS0 ROA (it re-publishes the ROA without the prefix)
- "slow to add"
 - Resources marked as undelegated are added to the AS0 ROA in a cron job and there is no urgency
- Outcome:
 - Newly delegated or re-delegated resources will NOT be on the current AS0 as quickly as possible
 - Newly reclaimed, undelegated resources appear on the AS0 ROA in a slower process



Why we run a separate TAL for AS0 ROA

- By default, the Main RPKI TAL is included in all relying party validator code, and is recommended for use in RPKI-RTR
 - Objects created in this RPKI will apply to BGP as quickly as they propagate to the people who use ROV
- By default, the AS0 RPKI TAL is recommended NOT to be used for RPK-RTR, but to be operated as a diagnostic/advisory service only
 - We do not recommend the AS0 ROA we maintain be applied to BGP directly
- In effect, using a separate TAL turns this service into an 'opt-in' process
 - By default, no BGP speaker will be affected by changes in the APNIC AS0 ROA
- See <u>https://www.apnic.net/community/security/resource-certification/apnic-limitations-of-liability-for-rpki-2/</u>



What should you do with these AS0 ROA?

- These are assertions made directly by a registry
- We specifically do NOT recommend they are used to directly filter BGP, or calculate validity in your routing
- But, we do suggest they are used as a live diagnostic
- Example 1: run BGPAlerter
 - Configure a prefix list based on a VRP state from the AS0 TAL
- Example 2: run a stub BGP peer "inside", which can be used for diagnostic
 - Configure RPKI-RTR from a VRP state which uses the AS0 TAL, log invalids



Configuring BGPAlerter to read a ROA feed rpki: vrpProvider: external vrpFile: /path/to/vrp.json preCacheROAs: true, refreshVrpListMinutes: 15

- This configures your BGPAlerter to read a VRP file off-disk
- Run any validator which produces a json VRP file, with the AS0 TAL



Or.. Take a bogons feed model?

• (from Tashi's slidepack on bogons and AS0)

Bogon Route Server Project

- In comes the Bogon Route Server project by Team Cymru
 - Provides dynamic bogons information using eBGP multihop sessions
 - Traditional bogons (AS65333)
 - martians plus prefixes not allocated by IANA



Full-bogons (AS65332)

- above plus prefixes allocated to RIRs but not yet assigned to ISPs/end-users by RIRs
- For details:
 - <u>http://www.team-cymru.org/bogon-reference-bgp.html</u>



AS0 in ROV

- Would help tag any incoming routes (from peers, transit, customers) within the undelegated (bogon) space as Invalid
 - mismatch of origin AS
- Based on the tag, you can:
 - Use it to filter out (drop) those routes, or
 - Compare the tagged routes with the full feed from a Bogon



You could internalize this

• Run a validator with AS0 TAL and compute the VRP set for AS0

- Run a stub AS in private space, with RPKI-RTR feed
 - Configure this to receive the AS0 TAL
 - Report visible AS0 ROA deprecated prefixes
 - Do not connect this to your public BGP, but use this to instrument and report'
- Run another validator with the main RPKI TAL set, without AS0 and use this to supply RPKI-RTR VRP to your BGP



Could APNIC publish AS0 over delegated resources?



Could APNIC publish AS0 over delegated resources?

- The APNIC AS0 TAL covers '0/0' so yes, theoretically we could
 - The Operational system uses a certificate to issue the ROA which (as for main RPKI) explicitly lists the ranges we have authority over, so the qualification is "not resources which we cannot show are properly delegated to APNIC to manage"
 - The operational system is designed to ONLY publish AS0 for resources which are publicly declared as 'available' or 'reserved' in line with address policy
 - The code we operate, does not permit us to make an AS0 TAL over other resources
- We could (in theory) but we declare that we don't, and we have no intention of changing our operational model to enable this



What if APNIC AS0 ROA does repudiate my resources?



What if APNIC AS0 ROA does repudiate my resources?

- Firstly, an AS0 ROA is 'lower priority' in BGP ROV than any other ROA
 - Simply make a ROA for your valid ORIGIN-AS and all ROV calculating systems will no longer be blocked: You have control over your own RPKI state at all times
- Secondly, the AS0 ROA TAL is explicitly marked as "do not include in BGP" by APNIC
 - We recommend ROV calculation NOT automatically apply AS0 repudiations to BGP
- Contact APNIC NOC or helpdesk IMMEDIATELY if you see any problems
 - We're checking our systems state 24/7, but please alert us to problems you see in APNIC services



What about the other RIRs or NIRs?



What about the other RIRs or NIRs?

- RIPE explicitly rejected operation of an AS0 system in the routing-wg
- AFRINIC are still considering the option in policy process
- ARIN have no active policy discussion or proposal
- LACNIC accepted an AS0 policy but have yet to deploy a service
- APNIC NIR are explicitly covered by address policy, but all NIR holdings are considered "delegated" and so we will not be making AS0 ROA over un-used NIR delegations
 - The NIR might elect to do this or ask us to do this
 - But not at this time



What does the future hold for RPKI and AS0?



What does the future hold for RPKI and AS0?

- RPKI uptake worldwide is on the increase
 - For growth information in the number of active RPKI creators worldwide:
 - <u>https://www.nro.net/about/rirs/statistics/</u>
 - <u>https://stats.labs.apnic.net/rpki/</u>
 - For specific status of prefixes, ASNs
 - https://bgp.he.net
 status
 - https://rpkiviz.zdns.cn
 - <u>https://jdr.nlnetlabs.nl/</u>

% coverage of address space

% ROV by economy, ASN

"key" symbol indicates RPKI

RPKI tree visualiser RPKI tree visualiser

- AS0 is being maintained and operated 24/7 by APNIC
 - Reports on usage delivered to APNIC meeting routing security SIG



Summary: APNIC AS0 is only for undelegated

- APNIC AS0 ROA is only for undelegated, reserved resources
- APNIC does not use AS0 as a "turn it off" control for delegated resources
- APNIC does not include AS0 ROA in the main RPKI system which directly drives BGP ROV
- APNIC recommends AS0 ROA be used as a diagnostic or advisory service only
- If you believe an incorrect AS0 ROA exists over your prefixes, issue a ROA for the origin-AS you wish to assert — it has higher priority
- Tell APNIC about any problems with APNIC services
 - <u>noc@apnic.net</u> or helpdesk@apnic.net





QUESTIONS?







