

AS0 Implementation report to Routing SIG

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Prop132 "AS0 for unallocated and unassigned resources"

- We have implemented Prop132
 - APNIC now publishes and maintains an AS0 "ROA" for all un-delegated resources in our registry
 - These are the IPv4 and IPv6 resources listed as "available" or "reserved" in our daily published delegated statistics files
 - The AS0 ROA is defined in RFC6483 as "a disavowal of routing origination"

A ROA with a subject of AS 0 (AS 0 ROA) is an attestation by the holder of a prefix that the prefix described in the ROA, and any more specific prefix, should not be used in a routing context.

- This is now a fully deployed service
 - With systems monitoring 24/7 integrated into our operations platforms
 - Deployed in the cloud for the publication point (data repository)
 - At this stage, deployed in a stand-alone Trust Anchor Locator (TAL)



Implementation report:testbed

- An initial Testbed was deployed for APRICOT/APNIC49
 - Based on the "Krill" system from NLNet Labs
 - Operating on the delegated files as a daily view of registry
 - Using a temporary, soft-keyed Trust Anchor (TA) in a TAL file
 - Publishing the repository inside APNIC VM on the test network
 - This service was used by a small number of people (<10)
 - We were able to confirm issues with discrete ROA per prefix
 - We understood our operational needs to manage the ROA as resources are issued by APNIC



Implementation report:production

- We have now deployed this service into production
 - Still based on delegated files, but with a delay to prevent accidental exclusions if delegated files are out of synchronization with registry
 - Live updates to Registry (delegations) are applied within 5 minutes to both main RPKI and AS0 RPKI state
 - Delegations are removed from the AS0 ROA within 5 minutes of resources being assigned or allocated from the free pool.
 - We are collecting statistics on use, and the scale of BGP effects which will be presented to the Routing Security SIG



Implementation report: Production

- In-house deployment on VM
 - Tightly coupled to registry events, so max 5min lag from delegations
 - Prevents AS0 denying validly delegated resources as quickly as possible
 - General RPKI also now re-synchronized more rapidly
 - HSM backed trust anchor keypair
 - Same level of assurance as main line TA
- Cloud deployment of repository (GCP)
 - Both rsync and RRDP supported
 - Will distribute in GCP when 2nd and further nodes commissioned
- Fully managed and monitored 24/7 by APNIC operations

Where to from here?

- Further discussion of this service is now conducted in the APNIC Routing Security SIG
 - Statistics on use,
 - Size of ROA,
 - Operational experiences,
 - Future directions.



Some initial statistics

- Initial outcome: 69 routes marked bad in DFZ from ~65k prefixes
 - (reported by Job Snijders during deployment testing)
- Usage: Released week of 1st September
 - 24 ASN now fetching from the service
 - More stats on usage will follow once we see traffic



ASN using the AS0 TAL

ASN	Name	Economy	ASN	Name	Economy
9443	VOCUS-RETAIL-AU Vocus Retail	AU	3265	XS4ALL-NL Amsterdam	NL
38345	ZDNS Internet Domain Name System Beijing	CN	8587	INFRACOM-AS	NL
4837	CHINA169-BACKBONE CHINA UNICOM	CN	15169	GOOGLE	US
4812	CHINANET-SH-AP China Telecom (Group)	CN	20473	AS-CHOOPA	US
4847	CNIX-AP China Networks Inter-Exchange	CN	395747	CLOUDFLARENET-SFO05	US
17621	CNCGROUP-SH China Unicom Shanghai network	CN	8075	MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK	US
23910	CNGI-CERNET2-AS-AP China Next Generation Internet	CN	14618	AMAZON-AES	US
4134	CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31	CN	14061	DIGITALOCEAN-ASN	US
1136	KPN KPN National	EU	132892	CLOUDFLARE Cloudflare	US



Some initial statistics: Size of ROA

- AS0 ROA is 1,017,637 bytes long (at present)
- 66,109 IPv4 and IPv6 prefixes encoded in one Object
 - 1,522 IPv4
 - 64,588 IPv6
 - The IPv6 count is a function of "sparse" allocation



Implementation architecture



- On-premises and GKE Sydney deployments
- HSM backed TAL, follows main line RPKI
- Re-use of existing RPKI systems code
 - Actual signing carried out by Krill (NLNet)
- Repository structure served from GKE
 - Capable of being distributed in future
 - Using CloudFlare front-end



