

Based on work by ... Ólafur Guðmundsson Martin J. Levy ... with help from ... Louis Poinsignon Wouter de Vries ... plus the whole resolver team

1.1.1.1

A public resolver focused on privacy

Announced April 1st 2018

Our mission: to help build a better Internet.

We use 1.1.1.1 and 1.0.0.1 (easy to remember) for our resolver.

Addresses provided to Cloudflare by APNIC for both joint research and this service.

We focused on privacy!

We knew we would spend a lot of time cleaning up the global Internet to make 1.1.1.1 work!

https://blog.cloudflare.com/announcing-1111/ https://blog.cloudflare.com/dns-resolver-1-1-1/ 1.1.1.1

served by Cloudflare's Global

DNS resolver, 1.1.1.1, is

Anycast Network.



APNIC Labs and Cloudflare

APNIC Labs enters into a research agreement with Cloudflare

By Geoff Huston on 2 Apr 2018

Category: Tech matters

Tags: DNS, Research



1.1.1.1

APNIC is allocated 1.0.0.0/8

by IANA in January 2010

APNIC Labs is partnering with Cloudflare for a joint research project relating to the operation of the DNS.

I'd like to explain our motivation in entering into this research project, explain what we hope to be able to achieve with this work, and describe briefly how we intend to handle the data that will be generated from this research activity.

The joint research project involves the operation of an open public DNS resolution service using IPv4 address prefixes that the APNIC Address Policy Special Interest Group (SIG) has set aside for research purposes. This project will provide APNIC Labs with unique opportunity to gain valuable insight into the query behaviour of the DNS in today's Internet and will allow us to further our existing research activities in looking at the DNS.

https://blog.apnic.net/2018/04/02/apnic-labs-enters-into-a-research-agreement-with-cloudflare/



The Cloudflare network (DNS, DDoS, CDN, WAF, more)



151+ Data centers globally

151+ DNS resolver locations

151+ DNS authoritative locations

1.1.1.1 design goals

DNS and privacy!

DNS itself is a 35-year-old protocol (and it's showing its age). It was never designed with privacy or security in mind.

DNS inherently is unencrypted so it leaks data to anyone who's monitoring your network connection.

We focused on privacy:

- Query Minimization RFC7816
- Aggressive negative answers RFC8198
- No Client Subnet on queries
- DNS-over-TLS (Transport Layer Security) RFC7858
- DNS-over-HTTPS protocol DoH (draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https)




1.1.1.1

In 2014, we decided to enable https encryption for free for all our customers (we doubled the size of the encrypted web).

In 2017, we made DDoS mitigation free & unmetered across all our plans.

DNS Query Minimization

- DNS is chatty, very chatty!
- Resolver can reduce the information leaked to intermediary DNS servers
 - The root, TLDs, and secondary zones
- Resolver only sends just enough of the name for the authority to tell the resolver where to ask the next question.



1.1.1.1

QNAME contains too much information.

DNS Aggressive Negative Answer

- Fewer lookups to authorities (in particular the root zone)
- Use the existing resolvers negative cache
 - Negative (or non-existent) information kept around for a period of time

1,1,1,1

QNAME contains too much

information.

- For zones signed with DNSSEC with the NSEC records in cache:
 - Resolver can figure out if the requested name does NOT exist without doing any further queries
 - If you type wwwwww dot something and then wwww dot something, the second query could well be answered with a very quick "no" (NXDOMAIN in the DNS world)
- Aggressive negative caching works only with DNSSEC signed zones, which includes both the root and ~1,400 out of 1,544 TLDs



Client Subnet == Bad privacy

Client Subnet: RFC7871/Experimental

- Used for traffic engineering when queries come from open resolvers or large resolver clusters
 - addr/netmask \Rightarrow fine grain "location" /24 commonly used
 - Bad for resolvers as it kills cache hit ratio
 - Resolver cache implementations got more complex
- Suggestions to use it to track devices behind a NAT

Not using ECS degrades performance in some cases

Fine grain steering vs course steering

Where should traffic steering actually happen?

- DNS
- Applications via referrals ?

What is acceptable scope for NetMask?



1.1.1.1

CS option frequently included on all queries ⇒ Massive data leak

How to find the right balance?

DNS-over-TLS / DNS-over-HTTPS

TLS (Transport Layer Security) is the basis of https encryption.

- DNS-over-TLS (RFC7858) is simply a DNS request(s) wrapped by TLS.
- DNS-over-HTTPS (draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-http) is DNS queries via an HTTPS request. **

Resolver, 1.1.1.1 now provides both - at scale!

- Mozilla Trusted Recursive Resolver
 - Cloudflare listed

** https://hacks.mozilla.org/2018/05/a-cartoon-intro-to-dns-over-https/ https://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2018/06/03/inside-firefoxs-doh-engine/

1.1.1.1

DNSSEC ensures integrity of data between resolver and authoritative server, it doesn't protect privacy of that data!

Specifically, DNSSEC doesn't protect the privacy of the "last mile".



Data Policy

- We don't store client IP addresses never, ever!
- We only use query names for things that improve DNS resolver performance.
- After obfuscation, APNIC research gets access to data (under our joint agreement).
- Cloudflare never stores any information in logs that identifies end user.
 - All log records are deleted within 24 hours.
- We will continue to abide by our privacy policy and ensure that no user data is sold to advertisers or used to target consumers.



All log records deleted within 24 hours



DNS resolver addresses

IPv4 & IPv6

1.1.1.1 1.0.0.1

2606:4700:4700::1111 2606:4700:4700::1001



1.1.1.1 polluted space Step 32 In the IP Address text box, enter the IP address of the controller's virtual interface. Polluted for many many years You should enter a fictitious, unassigned IP address such as 1.1.1. captive.apple.com SanLorenzoLumber_Guest Log In Cancel Figure 1-10 repeats the familiar case in which web server Larry wants to send part or a w CCENT/CCNA ICND1 100-105 Official Cert Guide Figure 1-10 repeats the familiar case in which web server Larry wants to senu part of a web page to Bob, but now with details related to IP. On the lower left, note that server Larry has a first the send to send to send the send to page to Bob, but now with details related to IP. On the lower letty note that server Larry has the familiar application data. HTTP header, and TCP header ready to send. In addition, the the familiar application data. HTTP header, and TCP neature ready to send: in addition, the message now contains an IP header. The IP header includes a source IP address of Larry's IP address (1.1.1.1) and a destination IP address of Bob's IP address (2.2.2.2). Cannot Verify Server Identity The identity of "1.1.1.1" cannot be verified by WI-Fi. Review the certificate Official Cent Guide details to continue. TO 2. Send to R2 1:39 ... I LTE Always to Bob 2222 Continue 2.2.2.2 I ON VIP I ATAM Details ICND1 100-105 Addre Log In Cancel 1 arry Cancel stination 2.2.2.2 MATA 1.1.1.1 - Source left of Figure 1-10, begins with Larry being ready to send an IP pack. Figure 1-10 Basic Routing Example socket to some router-a nearby router on the A major hardware Web Authentication vendor User Name Password CLOUDFLARE Submit Disclaimer

1.1.1.1 polluted space

Sadly, user "Samsonite801" will never be able to use 1.1.1.1 DNS resolver!

Hard to explain "assigned" vs "private"

Samsonite801	Quote:
LQ Newbie Registered: Jan 2017 Posts: 5	Originally Posted by Ulysses_ Getting tired of typing 192.168. Why doesn't everybody use something simple like 1.1.1.x in a small LAN? What about 0.0.0.x?
Rep: 🔳	I have been using 1.1.1.0/24 subnet for 15+ years on my home LAN and have never found a single instance where any computer in my house ever tried connecting to any address inside the 1.1.1.0-255 range outside my house. Yes, I realize these are 'publically allocated addresses' but I too got very sick and tired of typing 192.168.blah.blah all the time. I do extensive lab stuff fo work where I have servers I build and test in my LAN and am constantly typing IPs all the time.
	I still have no regrets about using this subnet. In fact, today in my lab work, I also use 1.1.2.0/24, 1.1.3.0/24, 1.1.4.0/24, 1.1.5.0/24, 1.1.6.0/24, 1.1.7.0/24, 1.1.8.0/24, 1.1.9.0/24 and for the 1.1.2. to 1.1.9. range those are only for lab equipment (have no gateways) for things like iSCSI, vMotion, VSAN and stuff like that so I don't care about them anyway.
	You know, if everyone in the world started using 1.1.x.x addresses for home and private LAN use then maybe the industry would change their standard and re-allocate these for official private LAN use, since if someone put a web server on those nobody would ever find their way there. They would be unpopular. Or I guess they are already unpopular because I don't see anyone really using them anyway.

https://www.linuxquestions.org/questions/linux-networking-3/why-doesn%27t-everyone-use-1-1-1-xor-1-1-x-x-or-1-x-x-addresses-in-their-lans-4175563056/



1.1.1.1 polluted space (the edge)

Many CPE routers use 1.1.1.1 for captive portals or configuration screens

- Pace (Arris) 5268
- D-Link DMG-6661
- Technicolor C2100T
- Calix GigaCenter ---- fixed 2018/Jun/12 thanks to a USER
- Nomadix (model(s) unknown)
- Xerox Phaser MFP

Deployed in the millions globally



Millions of CPE boxes globally



1.1.1.1 polluted space (backbones)

1.1.1.1

Why do backbones use this

route?

Good question!

Many backbones seem to have 1.1.1.1 backholed or used - for no real reason

We committed to fixing this by using our measurements to track down, contact and correct these inconsistencies. Here's a partial list of successfully cleaned backbones!

- Airtel, BHTelecom, Beirut-IX, Comcast, Fastweb, ITC, Kazakhtelecom, LG Telecom, Level(3), Liquid Telecom, MTN, Omantel, Rostelecom, SFR, SKBB, Sonatel, STC, Tata, Telecom Italia, Telenor, Telus, Turk Telekom, Turkcell, Voo, XS4ALL, Ziggo
- Many more ...

Thank you backbones. You have helped the Internet improve.




1.1.1.1 fixed in Senegal

- 1.1.1.1 (1.1.1.0/30) was in use internally within Sonatel
 - This isn't unusual (see previous slides)
 - Prevents end-users from accessing resolver at 1.1.1.1
 - However, 1.0.0.1 is available hence resolver always worked

1.1.1.1

Fixing 1.1.1.1, one network at a time!



• This is repeated in many countries and telcos



Measuring availability

- Thanks to the RIPE Atlas probes and thousands of tests
 - Tested ISPs globally for access to 1.1.1.1 (and 1.0.0.1)
 - Sent many emails to many NOCs **






** https://blog.cloudflare.com/fixing-reachability-to-1-1-1-globally/

1.1.1.1

RIPE Atlas to the rescue!

1.0.0.0/24 & 1.1.1.0/24 background noise

1.1.1.0/24 routing history



1.1.1.0/24 background traffic

- Previous studies:
 - **2010:** Greater than 100 Mbps on 1.1.1.0/24
 - **2014:** 100 Mbps \rightarrow 1 Gbps on 1.0.0.0/8 **
- Cloudflare routing:
 - \circ **2018:** 8 Gbps \rightarrow 13 Gbps (with 1 Gbps solely on 1.1.1.1)



10+ Gbps of noise!

1.0.0.0/24 gets about 1%

** https://conference.apnic.net/data/37/2014-02-27-prop-109_1393397866.pdf - Geoff Huston



1.1.1.0/24 background traffic


- TCP traffic (mostly HTTP proxy, services).
 Ports 80, 443, 8000, 8080, 8090, 8765
- UDP traffic (some DNS, syslogs).
 - Ports 53, 514, 8000, 80, 8090
- TP-Link DNS 1.0.0.19 **

 TP-Link routers send DNS queries to 1.0.0.19. What is that?

 Ive got a problem with TP-Link soho routers. The DNS forwarder of those routers tends to ignore the DNS servers obtained by DHCP and instead tries sending all DNS requests to this strange IP: 1.0.0.19? That IP doesn't respond.

 Has anyone else seen that happen?

 domain-name-system






10+ Gbps of noise!

** https://serverfault.com/questions/365613/ tp-link-routers-send-dns-queries-to-1-0-0-19-what-is-that/365630



1.1.1.0/24 background traffic

- Traffic source
 - Mostly China
 - US
 - countries in Asia
 - some Europe






10+ Gbps of noise!



1.1.1.0/24 bursts and patterns

- Two increases:
 - \circ 5 Gbps → 8 Gbps between 16:00 → 17:15 UTC
 - ° 8 Gbps → 12.5 Gbps between $17:15 \rightarrow 23:00$ UTC
 - Mostly on 1.1.1.7, 1.1.1.8, 1.1.1.9, and 1.1.1.10
 - Destination port 80
 - Increase from China
 - No particular difference on source IP/net
- Short bursts:
 - Only on 1.1.1.1 between $01:00 \rightarrow 02:00$ UTC for a few minutes
 - \circ 1 Gbps \rightarrow 10 Gbps
 - UDP traffic source port 123 (NTP) and port 11211 (memcached)
 - Misconfigured network devices?












1.1.1.0/24 bursts and patterns

- Also DHCP spikes from Macau
 - Bursts to 40 Mbps

10+ Gbps of noise!



• How many packets per second on UDP 53 (before launching)





1.1.1.0/24 what changed?

- Presentation from 10 years ago at NANOG49 **
 - "iperf traffic to 1.2.3.4 is roughly 10 Mbps of traffic from less than a 100 unique sources"

1.1.1.1

10+ Gbps of noise!

- 2018: we still see iperf traffic (port 5000/5001)
 - Around 10-20 times the traffic

We estimate legitimate traffic to be around 7-13%

** https://www.nanog.org/meetings/nanog49/presentations/Monday/karir-1slash8.pdf Merit, APNIC, University of Michigan



1.0.0/24, 1.1.1.0/24 traffic

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4) Mays 8/9 00:07




1.1.1.1

10+ Gbps of noise!

1.1.1.1 @ ~ 600 Mbps 1.0.0.1 @ ~ 70 Mbps

1.1.1.0/24 noise somewhat down 1.0.0.0/24 noise significantly down

1.0.0/24, 1.1.1.0/24 traffic




1.1.1.1

1.1.1.0/24 noise

Routing

Traffic goes where ?

same loc 1001 different 1111 different test different all different



Date	1.0.0.1	1.1.1.1	Test	#
Mar/28	8.3%	14.7%	4.8%	16.7%
May/16	0.4%	3.0%	0.2%	3.4%
Jun/21	1.2%	4.2%	1.5%	5.0%

Reachability issues persist

Old Tunnels never die




120.00%

Measured from Ripe Atlas probes

1.1.1.1

Measuring availability (via pings)





1.1.1.1

Resolver reachability

Green - All working Red = 1.1.1.1 fails Pink = 1.0.0.1 fails Purple = both fail

Early August/2018

Hilbert curves are cool!

Captive Portals are the worst

Debug Information

Connected to 1.1.1.1	No
Using DNS over HTTPS (DoH)	No
Using DNS over TLS (DoT)	No
AS Name	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
AS Number	3
Cloudflare Data Center	BOS

1.1.1.1


MIT Guest network at 22/6/2018 10:14

Connectivity to Resolver IP Addresses

1.1.1.1	No
1.0.0.1	Yes
2606:4700:4700::1111	No
2606:4700:4700::1001	No



Adoption




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About route leaks

1.1.1.0/24 leaks happen

- The heavy use of 1.1.1.1 in networks (running BGP) trigger route leaks
- Cloudflare has a signed RPKI ROA for both 1.0.0.0/24 & 1.1.1.0/24
 - RPKI signed but doesn't (yet) stop route leaks
- The 29 May 2018 leak was ~60 seconds in length
 It lasted longer on twitter
- This must stop; not just for this route, but on all routes!



ROA validation successful

RPKI status:





Speed (prefill)

We prefill all caches based on popular domains in a region

- Why: To improve perceived speed and availability
- Popular domains should always be cached
 - What is popular?


1.1.1.1



Speed (backend multicast)

Multicasted cache data across machines within the same data center

- Why: Cache hit ratio goes down with the network size
- Cache hit ratio is everything
- Basically a pub-sub
- Consistent latency



1.1.1.1



Speed

https://www.dnsperf.com/#!dns-resolvers



https://blog.thousandeyes.com/ranking-performance-public-dns-providers-2018/



DNSPerf measurements

Period: Last 30 days

100 120 140 160 180 200

.

Speed (in APNIC region)

As	ia 👻	Raw Performance		Uptir	ne		Qual	ity		Last 30	days		•					
	DNS name	Query Speed	0	20	40	60	80	100	120	140	160	180	200					
1	1.1.1.1	30.83 ms	-				1	1	T T		l I		1					
2	OpenDNS/Umbrella	43.77 ms	-		-	1	i.											
3	Google	49.24 ms	+						1		1							
4	Neustar	89.79 ms	-				į	•	Ì	Locat		Тут						_
5	Quad9	92.97 ms	-	1		- 42	1	- 1		Oce	DNS name	•	Raw Performance		Uptime	60	Qual	ity
6	SafeDNS	94.63 ms	-	1		18	-	-		1	1.1.1.1		Query Speed 8.48 ms	0	20 40	60	80	10
7	Norton	97.02 ms	+	-				÷₿.	1	2	SafeDNS OpenDNS/Um	bralla	23.52 ms	-				
8	Verisign	142.6 ms	-	1		- 44				4	Quad9	DIENA	37,49 ms	_				
										5	Norton Neustar		125.74 ms	-				
										7	Google		149.91 ms	-				
CLC	UDFLARE									8	Comodo		198.57 ms	-		_		_



Summary

- Easy to remember IP addresses
- Support for DOH (DNS over HTTPS) and DNS over TLS
- Cleaning up routing and CPE devices
- Did I mention it's fast?



1.1.1.1

Setting up the resolver: https://1.1.1.1/

1.1.1.1

#1dot1dot1dot1

https://1.1.1.1/ https://one.one.one.one/

