

Software and DNS operations at ISC What's new?

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BIND 9.4

- BIND 9.4 includes a few radical new features and needs exhaustive testing
 - Its performance is much better than that of previews BIND 9 releases.
 - Additional cache
 - Architecture dependant lock relief using atomic operation support



Ongoing work

- Things we are working on
 - GSS-TSIG
 - NSEC3
 - New hash support (SHA-256)
 - New resolver library
 - Better, more complete stats and new way of fetching them



GSS-TSIG

- Work started 2 years ago but stumbled on implementation incompatibilities and fuzzy standard interpretation
- Currently finalising details for running on Windows, though it already interoperates with MS Active directory. Just run it on Unix-like OSes.



NSEC3

- This is an example of the work ISC does to implement early standards work into BIND to enable analysis of the work in progress
- Work is being sponsored by Verisign and Nominet







New resolver library

- Work initially undertaken by Jinmei Tatuya of Toshiba, working at ISC
- Will be used first in conjunction with ISC DHCP
- Current work on integration is ongoing







DNS operations

- ns-ext/ns-any
 - ns-ext.isc.org == ns-ext.vix.com
- Secondary service for TLDs or public interest SLDs
 - Free on best effort basis
 - Fee based if SLA required
- Now going to anycast.
 - Each zone operator can tell us if they wish to

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use the anycast or unicast service.

DNS Operations - F root

- More, better, faster :)
- Recent anycast nodes added
 - Caracas
- Looking to install in Fiji very soon
- Agreement with Neustar to install on their DNS Shield product







What is this good for?

- Examples:
 - Taiwan earthquake
 - DDoS 6 February 2007























February DDoS

A number of the Internet root and TLD name servers sustained a DDoS attack. While this attack didn't have an impact on the service to end-users it was measured and we'll share the preliminary observations made at F-root including the type, quantity and distribution of attack traffic and how we coped.





Aggregated traffic on F root









Some nodes got nothing





Others saw peculiar patterns







Packet analysis

- Average size was bigger than normal traffic
- Most were more than 350 bytes
- Some were malformed DNS messages
- Contained random QTYPEs (updates, unknown, etc)



