

Zheng Wang

wangzheng@conac.cn

China Organizational Name Administration Center





A Corner Case DNS Configuration

May facilitate DNS zone management

Concerns about DNS compatibility and security risks arise

Background and Problem



A set of DNS servers may host many (largely small) zones falling into the same parent zone

- Each zone is individually configured in the conf file
- Complicate conf file management: a single zone update triggers conf file change
- Complicate zone file management: zone content update is located in varied zone file
- Server synchronization needs additional mechanism besides XFR
- Slow startup speed: many complaints about BIND 9 on this until an optimization method is released in July



Solution



A simple idea: merge the zones into one?

- The aggregated zone must be the parent zone to embrace all subzones
- Equivalent to rewriting a zone below the delegation of its apex
- The zone contains all subzones' records along with the SOA and NS records at the apex except for all subzones' SOA records
- Configure the parent zone in the conf file
- Possible conflicts with DNS specifications?



Implications



From the perspective of the DNS server:

- It believes itself serves the authoritative parent zone
- So when queries from the resolver arrives, it response just as the authoritative server as the parent zone

Only queries for the subzones can be directed to it due to the corresponding delegations in the parent zone

If applicable:

- A single zone is configured in the conf file
- Easy conf file management: conf file remains stable regardless of zone update
- Easy zone file management: all zone content updates are located in one zone file
- Easy server synchronization: XFR is enough
- Fast startup: minimized zone file amounts

Implications (Cont')



Possible conflicts with DNS specifications:

The subzone' s SOA and NS records are missing from the authority section of response which may be not expected by the resolver

How does the resolver explain it? Or can the resolver accept it?

Tests on DNS Implementations



As viewed from an individual authoritative server, zone configurations and zone content are compliant to DNS specifications, the test is only necessary for the resolver implementation.

Authoritative zone file configuration (BIND 9.6.1cn2-P1)

\$ORIC	GIN te	st.			\$OR
@	IN	SOA			@
@	IN	NS	d	Ins	@
dns	IN	А	21	8.241.108.65	dns
spam	IN	NS	dr	ns.cnnic	spar
cnnic	IN	NS	dı	ns.cnnic	cnni
dns.cn	nic	IN	А	218.241.108.66	dns. www
cnnic2		IN	A	218.241.108.66	WWV

parent zone

merged child zones

\$ORIGIN test.				
@	IN	SOA		
@	IN	NS	dns	
dns	IN	А	218.24	41.108.66
spam IN cnnic IN		NS NS	dns.c dns.c	
dns.cnnic www.spam		IN IN	A 2	18.241.108.66 18.241.108.66
www.cnnic		IN	A 2	18.241.108.66



dig +trace results show the DNS resolution path

BIND resolver (BIND 9.6.1cn2-P1)

dig www.cnnic.test +trace	
. 3582 IN NS dns. ;; Received 49 bytes from 218.241.108.74#53(218	.241.108.74) in 0 ms
test. 3600 IN NS dns.test. ;; Received 66 bytes from 218.241.108.64#53(dns)	in 0 ms
cnnic.test. 5 IN NS dns.cnnic.tes	t.
;; Received 66 bytes from 218.241.108.65#53(dns.	test) in 0 ms <u>Author</u> itative response?
www.cnnic.test. 3 IN A 218.241.108 test. 3 IN NS dns.test.	
;; Received 82 bytes from 218.241.108.66#53(dns.	cnnic.test) in 0 ms



BIND resolver can successfully return all pertinent records

BIND resolver (BIND 9.6.1cn2-P1)

ſ		
	dig www.cnnic.test	
	;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 6181 ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 0	
	;; QUESTION SECTION: ;www.cnnic.test. IN A	
	;; ANSWER SECTION: www.cnnic.test. 3 IN A 218.241.108.66 Synthetized from	om the delegation
	:: AUTHORITY SECTION:	
	cnnic.test. 5 IN NS dns.cnnic.test.	
	;; Query time: 1 msec ;; SERVER: 218.241.108.74#53(218.241.108.74)	



dig +trace results show the DNS resolution path of a negative answer

BIND resolver (BIND 9.6.1cn2-P1)

dig ww1.cnnic.test +trace

. 3576 IN NS dns. ;; Received 49 bytes from 218.241.108.74#53(218.241.108.74) in 0 ms

test. 3600 IN NS dns.test. ;; Received 66 bytes from 218.241.108.64#53(dns) in 0 ms

cnnic.test. 5 IN NS dns.cnnic.test. ;; Received 66 bytes from 218.241.108.65#53(dns.test) in 0 ms

test. 3 IN SOA dns.test. cert.cnnic.test. 2 20 20 604800 3600 ;; Received 76 bytes from 218.241.108.66#53(dns.cnnic.test) in 0 ms

Negative answer test: Nothing unusual except for the missing SOA record

BIND resolver (BIND 9.6.1cn2-P1)

dig ww1.cnnic.test

;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NXDOMAIN, id: 50985 ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 0

;; QUESTION SECTION: ;ww1.cnnic.test. IN A

;; Query time: 1 msec ;; SERVER: 218.241.108.74#53(218.241.108.74) ;; WHEN: Tue Oct 18 09:55:56 2011 ;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 32



UNBOUND also supports, but without synthetized authority section

UNBOUND 1.2.0

dig www.cnnic.test		
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 52082 ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 0		
;; QUESTION SECTION: ;www.cnnic.test. IN A		
;; ANSWER SECTION: www.cnnic.test. 3 IN A 218.241.108.66		
;; Query time: 4 msec ;; SERVER: 218.241.108.74#53(218.241.108.74)		



UNBOUND 1.2.0

dig ww1.cnnic.test		
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QU ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, AN	-	status: NXDOMAIN, id: 13508 R: 0, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 0
;; QUESTION SECTION: ;ww1.cnnic.test.	IN	A
;; Query time: 1 msec ;; SERVER: 218.241.108.74#5	3(218	3.241.108.74)

Does this configuration make it possible for the server administrator to compromise its parent zone?



Seemingly viable through parent zone rewriting, but how to link the subzone records in service to the residual space of the parent zone?

CNAME chain may do this!

- Configure a CNAME record to point to any record in the zone interested
- The response is sure to include the inzone CNAME chain
- The only problem is whether the resolver would accept the CNAME chain

Authoritative response of the merged zone

dig @218.241.108.66 ww1.spam.test
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 13161 ;; flags: qr aa rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; QUESTION SECTION: ;ww1.spam.test. IN A
;; ANSWER SECTION: ww1.spam.test. 3 IN CNAME cnnic2.test.
cnnic2.test. 3 IN A 218.241.108.65
;; AUTHORITY SECTION: test. 3 IN NS dns.test.
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION: dns.test. 3 IN A 218.241.108.66
;; Query time: 0 msec ;; SERVER: 218.241.108.66#53(218.241.108.66)



BIND resolver (BIND 9.6.1cn2-P1)

dig ww1.spam.test
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 38370 ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 0
;; QUESTION SECTION: ;ww1.spam.test. IN A
;; ANSWER SECTION: ww1.spam.test3INCNAME_cppic2_test
cnnic2.test. 5 IN A 218.241.108.66
;; AUTHORITY SECTION: test. 3600 IN NS dns.test.



UNBOUND 1.2.0

dig ww1.spam.test
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 38296 ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; QUESTION SECTION: ;ww1.spam.test. IN A
;; ANSWER SECTION: ww1 spam test 3 IN CNAME cnnic2 test
cnnic2.test. 5 IN A 218.241.108.66
;; AUTHORITY SECTION: test. 3600 IN NS dns.test. From the parent zone!
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION: dns.test. 3600 IN A 218.241.108.65
;; Query time: 1 msec ;; SERVER: 218.241.108.74#53(218.241.108.74)

BIND and UNBOUND are not caught in the trap!

They do not accept the chained results as the final authoritative answer

The canonical name are queried in a dedicated separate request whose response is handle by the parent zone

Zone Loading Tests



Startup performance has been significantly improved!



1 GB of RAM, one quad-core processors running at 3.2 GHz, and standard SATA drives configured without any raid or mirroring.

Each test zone was loaded from one of many different physical files. Each file was identical in its content, which included one SOA record, two NS records, and two A records.





A DNS zone merging method is proposed

Though possibly problematic in DNS compatibility, it does work in at least BIND and Unbound implementations

Parent zone compromise risks exists but are avoided by BIND and Unbound implementations



Thank You !